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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The best-interests-of-the-child standard has been the prevailing legal rule 
for resolving child-custody disputes between parents for nearly forty years. 
Almost from the beginning, it has been the target of academic criticism.1 As 
Robert Mnookin famously argued in a 1976 article, “best interests” are vastly 
indeterminate2— more a statement of an aspiration than a legal rule to guide 
custody decisionmaking.3 The vagueness and indeterminacy of the standard 
make outcomes uncertain and gives judges broad discretion to consider almost 
any factor thought to be relevant to the custody decision. This encourages 
litigation in which parents are motivated to produce hurtful evidence of each 
other’s deficiencies that might have a lasting, deleterious impact on their ability 
to act cooperatively in the actual best interests of their children. 
Despite these deficiencies, the best-interests standard has proved to be 
remarkably durable. Although scholars as well as the American Law Institute 
(ALI) have proposed reforms,4 legislative efforts to narrow the best-interests 
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 1.  See, e.g., David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 
83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the 
Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions 
in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975); Rena Uviller, Fathers’ 
Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 107 (1978). 
 2.  See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 229. 
 3.  See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 255 (quoting Lon Fuller, Sociology of Law Class Materials: 
Interaction Between Law and Its Social Context 11 (Summer 1971), in which the author had observed 
that a judge deciding custody under the best-interests standard is “not applying law or legal rules at all, 
but is exercising administrative discretion . . . .”).  
 4.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
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standard have been largely unsuccessful. A few states have adopted a rule that 
bases custody on parents’ caretaking, but at least one legislature has responded 
to a courts’ imposition of a primary-caretaking rule by rejecting that rule and 
reviving the best-interests standard.5 Repeated efforts by fathers’ groups to 
enact laws favoring joint custody have usually failed as well.6 The persistence of 
the best-interests standard presents a puzzle: Are the academic critics wrong or 
does something other than the utility of the rule explain the reluctance of 
policymakers to change the status quo? 
In this article, we confirm the deficiencies of the best-interests standard and 
seek to explain its persistence despite its obvious limitations. First we argue that 
the standard’s entrenchment is the product of a gender war that has played out 
in legislatures and courts across the country for decades. Most substantive 
reforms have been perceived (usually accurately) as favoring either fathers or 
mothers, and thus have generated political battles between their respective 
advocates. The primary front in this war has been a protracted battle over joint 
custody. Fathers’ groups have lobbied hard for statutes favoring joint physical 
custody, but they have been opposed vigorously by women’s advocates.7 As a 
result of the standoff, little progress has been made (in any direction) toward 
replacing the best-interests standard with a custody decision rule that would 
narrow and guide the judicial inquiry. 
Mothers’ and fathers’ supporters have also battled over the formulation of 
the best-interests standard itself, with each group arguing for presumptions that 
can trump other factors when the standard is applied. Mothers’ advocates, allied 
with law-enforcement groups, have lobbied effectively for a statutory 
presumption disfavoring the parent who has engaged in acts of domestic 
violence.8 Fathers’ groups have responded by seeking to persuade courts and 
legislatures to assign substantial negative weight to one parent’s concerted 
efforts to alienate the child from the other parent.9 Each of these factors 
implicates a key policy concern and, in theory, might bring greater determinacy 
to custody doctrine in important categories of cases. But domestic-violence and 
alienation claims are difficult to verify, and courts are often ill equipped to 
separate valid claims from those that are weak or false.10 This uncertainty 
encourages contesting parents to raise marginal claims, which, if successful, can 
trump other factors relevant to the best-interests determination.11 In turn, 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2002). The ALI custody standard is based on the approximation standard 
proposed by one of the authors. See Elizabeth Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, 
80 CALIF. L. REV. 615 (1992) [hereinafter Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody]. 
 5.  See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009). The primary-caretaker preference had been adopted by the 
state supreme court. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710–11 (Minn. 1985). 
 6.  See infra text accompanying notes 41–62.  
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Many custody statutes include a rebuttable presumption disfavoring the parent who has 
engaged in domestic violence. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.  
 9.  See infra text accompanying notes 105–114.  
 10.  See infra text accompany notes 87–88, 112–115.  
 11.  See infra text accompanying notes 89–111 (discussing defensive and offensive use of these 
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excessive use of domestic-violence and parental-alienation claims threatens to 
diminish the credibility of genuine claimants.12 
The gender-based motivations of advocates battling over doctrinal reform 
are understandable, but the apparent satisfaction of legal actors with the best-
interests standard is more puzzling. Judges and legislators are familiar with the 
application of the standard in practice and might be expected to be concerned 
about its indeterminacy.13 We argue that the legal system’s confidence in the 
best-interests standard rests on a misplaced faith in the ability of psychologists 
and other mental-health professionals (MHPs) to evaluate families and advise 
courts about custodial arrangements that will promote children’s interests.14 
This confidence in MHPs is not justified. Clinical testimony in custody 
proceedings often fails to meet even minimal standards of scientific validity and 
MHPs have no special expertise in obtaining reliable family information in the 
context of divorce.15 Moreover, psychology training and knowledge currently 
does not provide the expertise to perform the complex function of evaluating 
and comparing noncommensurable factors.16 Mental-health experts are no 
better than judges at these tasks; their participation simply masks the failure of 
the best-interests standard to provide legal guidance. 
Although this account is rather pessimistic, there is reason to believe that 
the deadlock can be broken if lawmakers understand that MHPs cannot cure 
the deficiencies of the best-interests standard. We argue for the adoption of the 
ALI’s approximation standard, under which custody is allocated between 
parents on the basis of past caretaking. This rule offers a relatively verifiable 
proxy for best interests that narrows judicial discretion and obviates the need 
for psychological evidence; it might also be increasingly attractive as fathers’ 
parenting role expands.17 Moreover, even under existing law, evidentiary and 
procedural reforms can mitigate the problems of the best-interests standard. 
Psychological testimony can be subject to the screening that applies to scientific 
evidence in other legal proceedings.18 Also, mediation and other reforms can 
facilitate custody planning by parents themselves. Parents have better 
information about family functioning than third-party decisionmakers and, in 
 
claims).  
 12.  See infra text accompanying notes 102–104.  
 13.  See infra text accompanying note 116.  
 14.  See infra Part IV. Mental-health experts in custody disputes include psychologists, 
psychiatrists, clinical social workers and other clinicians.  
 15.  See id.  
 16.  See id. See generally Robert E. Emery, Randy K. Otto & William T. O’Donohue, A Critical 
Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations: Limited Science and a Flawed System, 6 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. 
INT. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations] (arguing, 
on scientific grounds, that tests developed to assess questions related to custody are deficient); Timothy 
Tippins & Jeffrey Wittman, Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody Recommendations, 43 FAM. 
CT. REV. 193 (2005) (finding that the empirical foundation for conclusions based on psychological 
evaluations in custody cases is tenuous or nonexistent).  
 17.  See Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4; infra Part VI.  
 18.  See infra Part VI.B.  
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most cases, are more likely than judges to make workable plans for their post-
divorce families.19 
This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the deficiencies of the 
best-interests standard, focusing on the daunting verifiability challenges judges 
face in applying the standard. Part III explores the political-economy 
explanation for the persistence of the best-inerests standard. It examines the 
gender war in legislatures, focusing particularly on the repeated battles over 
joint custody in recent decades. Part IV explores the struggles to elevate the 
importance of domestic violence and parental alienation respectively as key 
factors in applying the standard, efforts that create a veneer of determinacy 
important categories of cases. Part V focuses on the illusion of mental-health 
expertise as the second key to the entrenchment of the best-interests standard. 
We challenge the assumption that MHPs enable courts to escape the 
indeterminacy of best interests and can guide them toward good custody 
decisions. Part VI proposes substantive and procedural reforms that can 
improve custody decisionmaking, potentially resulting in arrangements that 
conform more closely to the law’s policy goal. 
II 
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD? 
A. Critiquing and Justifying the Standard 
Much of the academic critique of the best-interests standard is familiar and 
need not be rehearsed in detail.20 Like indeterminate standards generally, the 
best-interests test generates high enforcement costs, inviting litigation and 
imposing substantial burdens on courts and parties.21 In addition, custody 
adjudication imposes onerous psychological costs that are exacerbated under 
the best-interests standard. Because of its indeterminacy and the salience of 
qualitative considerations,22 the standard encourages parents to produce 
evidence of each other’s failings, intensifying hostility between them and 
undermining their inclination to cooperate in the future in matters concerning 
their child.23 
 
 19.  But see Jana Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family: Implications of a 
Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009) (describing trend toward private ordering, including 
mediation, and expressing concern).  
 20.  See Mnookin, supra note 1.  
 21.  See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560–62 
(1992); see also Robert Scott & George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 814, 818–19 (2006) (noting that indeterminate standards encourage parties to produce a broad 
range of evidence in an effort to generate proxies that courts will favor).  
 22.  Under the best-interests standard the quality of parenting and of each parent’s relationship 
with the child are key factors. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009).  
 23.  See Elster, supra note 1, at 24 (emphasizing the high costs to the child of custody litigation); 
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4, at 622; Elizabeth Scott & Robert 
Emery, Custody Dispute Resolution: The Adversarial System and Divorce Mediation, in PSYCHOLOGY 
AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 23, 25 (Lois A. 
3_SCOTT & EMERY_EIC (RECOVERED) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014  9:39 AM 
No. 1 2014] GENDER POLITICS AND CHILD CUSTODY 73 
The substantial costs of applying an indeterminate standard are sometimes 
justified when the circumstances relevant to decisions are so complex and 
varied across cases that courts, with the advantage of hindsight, are in a better 
position to determine the relevant criteria to be applied in individual cases than 
are legislatures acting ex ante.24 The typical custody statute embodies this 
rationale, directing courts to consider a wide range of proxies for best interests, 
and thereby implicitly assuming that the mix of relevant factors and the weight 
accorded to each will vary across families.25 Certainly, supporters articulate this 
defense of the best-interests standard, arguing that, because of the complexity 
of family circumstances, courts must have broad discretion to consider any 
factor that might be relevant to a particular child’s best interests.26 On this view, 
a more determinate rule that would restrict parties’ freedom to introduce wide-
ranging evidence for judicial consideration is likely to result in bad decisions. 
The case for the standard thus necessarily assumes that courts are competent to 
select and weigh the relevant criteria for best interests in individual cases and to 
evaluate the evidence offered by each party in support of his or her claim. 
B. The Problem of Verifiability 
This assumption is false: Courts are not well positioned to select and weigh 
proxies for best interests or to evaluate the wide-ranging evidence offered by 
parties. Often the evidence deemed relevant to the judicial inquiry—and, 
relatedly, the criteria considered to be legitimate proxies for best interests—
cannot be verified; that is, contesting parents cannot prove such evidence to a 
third-party decisionmaker.27 To be sure, family circumstances are varied and 
 
Weithorn ed., 1987) (describing costs).  
 24.  Under these conditions, the costs of defining the precise content of regulation through rules 
that anticipate the many contingencies that might arise might be higher than the (high) enforcement 
costs of applying a vague standard. See Kaplow, supra note 21, at 560–62 (discussing the relative 
desirability of ex ante versus ex post lawmaking in terms of both legal costs and impact on behavior); 
Scott & Triantis, supra note 21, at 842–43 (2006) (emphasizing the benefit of hindsight enjoyed by 
courts).  
 25. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009) (prohibiting courts from focusing exclusively on one factor as 
abuse of discretion). Other courts have found trial courts’ overemphasis on any single factor to be an 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bartosz v. Jones, 197 P.3d 310 (Idaho 2008). 
 26.  Opponents of a joint-custody presumption or of the approximation standard argue that courts 
cannot be restricted from considering factors that might be important in individual cases. See ASSEMB. 
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307 (Cal. 2005), available at 
ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1301-
1350/ab_1307_cfa_20050502_142229_asm_comm.html (describing this argument against joint custody). 
One court cited approximation approvingly, but criticized it for restricting courts from considering 
factors other than past caretaking. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2006). 
 27.  Contracts scholars have probed the problem of verifiability, which arises when courts seek to 
interpret and evaluate compliance with vague contract terms. The challenge is particularly difficult in 
settings where the quality of performance is hard to evaluate, and information available to the parties is 
not readily accessible to third-party decisionmakers. See Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and 
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988) (noting that contingencies often cannot be described 
in enough detail in contracts for courts to later verify what has occurred); Alan Schwartz, Relational 
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 271 (1992) (discussing that courts often engage in “gap filling” when contracts are incomplete); 
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complex, and an omniscient judge might be capable of accurately assessing 
evidence and selecting appropriate criteria in each case for weighing the 
competing claims. But real-world judges frequently face insurmountable 
obstacles as they seek to perform their role faithfully. 
Three impediments severely handicap the ability of courts to evaluate the 
evidence offered by disputing parents. First, the privacy of family life makes 
assessing the accuracy of information in a custody proceeding extraordinarily 
difficult. Second, the best-interests standard exacerbates this problem by 
encouraging parties to introduce evidence of the quality of their parenting and 
relationships with the children. These qualitative proxies are particularly 
difficult for courts to evaluate accurately. And third, the factors considered to 
be good legal proxies for best interests are intrinsically incommensurable and 
judges simply are not capable of reliably calculating the weight of such factors 
relative to one another.28 
1. Family Privacy and Verifiability 
The ability of a third party to verify information about behavior and 
relationships within a family is limited under the best of circumstances, because 
much of family life is private and many interactions are not verifiable to 
outsiders even when they are observable to family members. For example, one 
parent might know from direct observation that the other has paid little 
attention to the child, but, unless the disinterest is extreme, it is difficult to 
convey this information persuasively to a judge. Beyond this, the parents’ 
perceptions about interactions and relationships might differ radically.29 
Distortions are likely to be particularly acute in the context of a contested 
divorce proceeding, when each parent is highly motivated to describe family 
relationships and behavior in a way that favors his or her claims.30 
2. The Challenge of Qualitative Proxies 
These challenges might undermine courts’ ability to acquire accurate 
information about family functioning under any rule or standard, but the 
verifiability problem is exacerbated under the best-interests standard. Because 
the standard implicitly focuses the inquiry on which party will be a better 
 
Scott & Triantis, supra note 21 (noting that vague contracts, which result in investment in the back end 
of the contracting process, might be more efficient in some circumstances).  
 28.  The incommensurability problem inheres in Mnookin’s observation that courts applying the 
best-interests standard ultimately must choose a set of values to guide decisions. See Mnookin, supra 
note 1, at 260–61.  
 29.  See ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD 
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATIONS 3–14 (2nd ed. 2011) [hereinafter EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS] (discussing husbands’ and wives’ conflicting perspectives on factual matters regarding 
their behavior and relationships with the child).  
 30.  Sometimes children can provide information, but younger children might not be reliable 
reporters. Giving minor children of any age a central role in providing evidence risks placing them in 
the middle of the dispute between their parents. See Robert E. Emery, Children’s Voices: Listening–and 
Deciding–is an Adult Responsibility, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 622 (2003) (arguing against involving 
children in custody disputes).  
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parent, it invites parties to introduce evidence of qualitative proxies for best 
interests that are difficult to assess accurately. Custody statutes emphasize, for 
example, the closeness of the relationship between parent and child, the 
parents’ stability and competence to care for the child, and the openness of each 
parent to the other’s relationship with the child.31 These factors might well be 
relevant to the child’s welfare, but they rest on complex emotional and 
psychological considerations that are often impervious to proof.32 Also, 
information obtained in the midst of a bitter divorce provides a poor basis for 
assessing family behavior and relationships before the crisis or for predicting 
the future, because both parents and children often experience high levels of 
stress.33 Thus a third party (a judge or MHP) might draw erroneous inferences 
about the parent–child relationship, or about a parent’s character, mental 
health, and childrearing competency on the basis of behavior that is context 
specific.34 
3. The Incommensurability Problem 
Finally, courts deciding custody face an often insurmountable challenge 
because key best-interests factors are inherently incommensurable and 
legislatures typically provide little guidance for resolving this problem. The 
general assumption (consistent with the choice of a standard rather than a rule) 
is that different proxies for best interests will vary in importance depending on 
the circumstances of the case,35 and as a consequence statutes do not guide 
courts by rank ordering factors. Thus, the court must assign weight to the 
various factors the parties’ evidence is intended to establish. But what is the 
right scale to use in balancing one parent’s claim that she has a closer bond with 
the child against the other’s insistence that he is more stable emotionally? To 
decide this question, the court must evaluate each factor on the basis of (1) its 
relative importance to the child’s best interests, in general and in the case, and 
(2) a judgment about the credibility and sufficiency of each party’s evidence 
supporting a finding that the factor has been established. Courts will often be 
unable to perform these tasks satisfactorily. Not only is this calculus prone to 
error because each of these factors is difficult to verify, but the weight assigned 
to competing factors will often ultimately rest on a subjective value judgment. 
It is clear that courts often face insurmountable challenges in applying the 
best-interests standard. To be sure, family circumstances are complex and 
varied, but, in this context, there is little reason to believe that the broad 
discretion the standard gives to judges results in better custody decisions. If 
courts lack the ability to perform the tasks required to determine the best 
interests of individual children, why has the best-interests standard endured for 
 
 31.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009). 
 32.  Thus the parties might know that one parent is inattentive or that one has the closer bond with 
the child, but proving that fact to a court in a bitterly contested custody case is often impossible.  
 33.  See EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 29.  
 34.  See infra Part IV. 
 35.  See Scott & Triantis, supra note 21, at 838–39.  
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forty years? Although scholars have been virtually unanimous in criticizing the 
current legal regime, courts and legislators appear unmoved. 
III 
LEGISLATIVE BATTLES OVER CUSTODY 
Two alternative custody rules have been advanced36 that would substantially 
reduce the verifiability challenges facing courts in deciding custody cases, but 
neither has been embraced by legislatures or courts. The first, a presumption 
favoring shared physical parenting has been vigorously promoted by fathers’ 
groups for more than a generation, with limited success.37 Mothers’ advocates 
have favored a rule that narrows the best-interests inquiry by focusing on past 
parental caregiving, but they have not actively promoted it in the political arena 
and it has gained little traction among lawmakers.38 
The durability of the best-interests standard (and the failure of lawmakers 
to adopt either of the alternative rules described above) is in part the result of a 
political-economy deadlock that has persisted for decades. The intense battles 
between interest groups supporting mothers and fathers have focused on many 
issues,39 but the ongoing struggle over joint custody has been the most sustained 
and pervasive campaign in this gender war. Well-organized men’s groups lobby 
for favorable joint-custody legislation, pitted against women’s groups who have 
opposed these efforts with considerable success. Women’s advocates have 
supported a primary-caretaker preference, but they have not promoted this rule 
actively in the political arena, directing their efforts instead at defeating joint-
custody initiatives and lobbying for domestic-violence presumptions.40 The 
political standoff over joint custody and the absence of the primary-caretaker 
preference from legislative agendas have left the best-interests standard 
 
 36.  The alternative rules, a presumption favoring joint custody and a rule focusing on past parental 
caretaking, feature prominently in family-law casebooks. See, e.g., IRA MARK ELLMAN, PAUL M. 
KURTZ, LOIS A. WEITHORN, BRIAN H. BIX, KAREN CZAPANSKIY & MAXINE EICHNER, FAMILY 
LAW: CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS 560 (5th ed. 2010). They have also been debated at length by scholars. 
See Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4.  
 37.  See infra text accompanying notes 48, 56, 62. 
 38.  Instead, mothers’ groups favor the primary-caretaker preference. See infra text accompanying 
notes 64–65. West Virginia adopted this rule in 1981. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 
1981) (establishing primary-caretaker preference and listing relevant factors). More recently, scholars 
and law reform groups have proposed an approximation rule that allocates future custodial time 
between the parents on the basis of past caregiving roles. See Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and 
Child Custody, supra note 4; infra Part VI; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206 (2009 & Supp. 2013) 
(adopting approximation standard).  
 39.  Fathers’ organizations have lobbied for parental-alienation provisions, restrictions on 
relocation by custodial parents, and reductions in child support, while mother advocates have opposed 
these efforts and promoted domestic-violence laws and restrictions on admissibility of parental-
alienation evidence. See AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & CHILDREN, LOBBYING TO INFLUENCE 
LEGISLATION IN YOUR STATE (2013), available at http://www.acfc.org/acfc/assets/documents/ 
Articles/acfcmanual_lobbying.pdf (describing lobbying activities of American Coalition of Fathers and 
Children, a large fathers’ rights organization).  
 40.  See infra text accompanying notes 64–73. 
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entrenched as the custody decision rule. 
A. The Fathers’ Movement and the Battle over Joint Custody 
Fathers’ advocates have actively sought to reform child-custody law since 
the 1970s.41 The political movement, which today includes a network of national 
and local organizations,42 arose out of dissatisfaction with the legal treatment of 
divorced fathers who, supporters believed, seldom won custody under the 
ostensibly gender-neutral best-interests standard. Advocates protested that 
restrictions on noncustodial fathers’ access to their children following divorce 
diminished the parent–child relationship. At the same time, fathers were 
required to assume a substantial burden of child support, which is a source of 
resentment for many fathers.43 
The sustained effort to enact state laws favoring joint legal and physical 
custody has been at the heart of fathers’ legislative agenda from the beginning.44 
In part, the goal was pragmatic: Fathers were unlikely to succeed in lobbying for 
a custody rule that favored fathers over mothers. But shared custody promised 
fathers equality with mothers in the allocation of custodial time and parental 
authority. It also could reduce the burden of child support as fathers assumed a 
larger share of child-care responsibility.45 
In legislatures across the country, men’s groups have promoted joint-
custody legislation, returning year after year in some states to lobby for 
favorable laws. The efforts have been intensive—including testimony, letter-
writing and email campaigns, media-advertising campaigns, blogging, and the 
placement of news stories, editorials, and op-eds.46 Many men’s organizations 
have active web sites that cover political activities relating to joint custody.47 
 
 41.  James Cook, an early fathers’ rights advocate, led a successful 1980 campaign to enact 
legislation favorable to joint custody in California. See James Cook, Activist, was the Father of Joint 
Custody, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at A28. 
 42.  Many men’s groups actively promote joint-custody reform. See AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & 
CHILDREN, http://www.acfc.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); EQUAL RTS. FOR DIVORCED FATHERS, 
http://www.equalrightsfordivorcedfathers.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); FATHERS & FAMILIES, 
http://www.fathersandfamilies.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); NAT’L COAL. FOR MEN, 
http://www.ncfm.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).  
 43.  See MEL ROMAN & WILLIAM HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 1–21 (1978) (describing 
fathers’ disgruntlement over traditional custody arrangements and advocating for joint custody); 
Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 459 (1984) 
(describing fathers’ anger at diminished role).  
 44.  The American Coalition for Fathers and Children states first among its goals “equal, shared 
parenting time or joint custody.” ACFC Mission Statement, AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & CHILDREN, 
http://www.acfc.org/mission/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
 45.  Many states have a different payment schedule for families in which the child resides for 
substantial periods with both parents. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (2009) (lower rates for obligor 
spending 110 days per year with child). 
 46.  See infra text accompanying notes 50, 62 (discussing 2005 California initiative); see also sources 
cited supra notes 40–43. 
 47.  See supra sources cited notes 39, 42 (seeking to mobilize support for joint-custody laws). The 
American Coalition for Fathers and Children keeps an active web site, blogging, issuing press releases, 
and archiving an online newsletter and articles about divorce and custody, See AM. COAL. FOR 
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The typical bill promoted by these organizations includes a presumption 
favoring equally shared physical custody, rebuttable only by clear and 
convincing evidence that this arrangement is not in the best interests of the 
child.48 
Joint-custody campaigns have encountered stiff opposition in most states 
from coalitions of opponents including, most prominently, advocates for 
mothers. Two types of women’s organizations have been particularly active: 
groups that advocate generally for women’s rights, particularly the National 
Organization for Women (NOW), and groups that focus on domestic violence 
and child abuse. NOW has taken a strong stand against a statutory presumption 
favoring joint custody and has lobbied hard (and successfully) in a number of 
states including California, Michigan, and New York.49 Domestic-violence 
organizations have rallied to persuade legislators that shared custody represents 
a serious threat to victims.50 These advocates often have been joined by 
organizations of judges and attorneys, who urge the need to retain judicial 
discretion under the best-interests standard.51 
In California, the battle over joint custody has played out over three 
decades. Responding to early lobbying efforts by fathers’ groups,52 California 
enacted a statute in 1980 that some read to create a preference for joint 
 
FATHERS & CHILDREN, http://www.acfc.org (last visited May 21, 2014). Glenn Sacks, director of 
Fathers and Families and a high-profile advocate for joint custody, writes a blog and appears on cable 
TV frequently. See GLENN SACKS, http://glennsacks.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).  
 48.  Such bills have been introduced in many states including West Virginia, Iowa, New York, 
California, Massachusetts, and Michigan. See, e.g., ASSEMB. A03181, 2009–10 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2009) (requiring court to order joint custody unless contrary to child’s interest); S.B. 438, 2009 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009). Michigan fathers’ groups have repeatedly lobbied for a shared–physical 
custody bill. See, e.g., H.B. 4564, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2007). After the court in In re Hansen, 733 
N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 2007), held that the Iowa custody statute did not create a presumption favoring joint 
physical custody, a group called Iowa Fathers lobbied for a bill clarifying that the statute does in fact 
create such a presumption. See Senate File 507, IOWAFATHERS, http://iowafather.websitetoolbox.com/ 
post/Senate-File-507-1764757?trail=50 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (forum urging men to vote for such a 
bill).  
 49.  NOW actively lobbied against a proposed bill creating a joint-custody presumption in New 
York in 2009. See Marcia Pappas, NOW - New York State Oppose Memo, Mandatory Joint Custody, 
NOW - N.Y. ST., http://www.nownys.org/leg_memos_2009/oppose_a3181.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2013). Earlier Mike McCormick and Glenn Sacks credited NOW with blocking shared-parenting 
legislation in New York and Michigan. See Glenn Sacks & Mike McCormick, NOW at 40: Group’s 
Opposition to Shared Parenting Contradicts Its Goal of Gender Equality, GLENN SACKS (July 27, 2006), 
http://glennsacks.com/blog/?page_id=2400. Business and Professional Women/USA also lobbied 
actively against the 2005 California bill. See ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307 
(Cal. 2005), available at ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1301-1350/ab_1307_cfa_ 
20050502_142229_asm_comm.html. 
 50.  A coalition of domestic-violence groups, the California Alliance against Domestic Violence, 
played a key role in the 2005 California battle over joint-custody legislation. See BILL ANALYSIS, AB 
1307; Irene Weiser & Marcia Pappas, Fathers’ Responsibilities Before Fathers’ Rights, NOW - N.Y. ST. 
(July 29, 2006), http://www.nownys.org/fathers_resp.html (arguing that mandatory joint custody 
threatens domestic-violence victims). 
 51.  In California, the family-law section of the state bar and the judicial council opposed the 2005 
joint-custody bill. See BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307.  
 52.  See supra text accompanying note 41.  
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custody.53 Women’s groups, described as “strangely silent” during the debate 
over this law, began to mobilize in the mid-1980s54 and lobbied successfully for 
the 1988 statutory revisions that clarified that California law included no 
presumption for joint custody.55 Since that time, the best-interests standard has 
remained the custody decision rule in California, despite major campaigns by 
fathers’ rights groups promoting shared parenting. In 2005, for example, a bill 
creating a presumption favoring equally shared physical custody was sponsored 
by a broad coalition of fathers’ rights organizations.56 The bill was opposed by 
women’s organizations,57 domestic-violence groups, the family-law section of the 
state bar, and organizations of judges, and it ultimately failed.58 
In general, the effort to promote joint-custody legislation has fallen far short 
of the goals of the fathers’ rights movement. To be sure, there have been some 
successes. Statutes in California and a few other states create a presumption 
favoring joint custody if parents agree to the arrangement, while other states 
direct courts to explain the decision not to order joint custody when proposed 
by a parent.59 And legislatures in many states have enacted policy statements 
endorsing substantial contact with both parents, often at the urging of fathers’ 
 
 53.  The statute lists joint custody first in the order of preferences that guides judges among 
available custody options. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a) (West 2004) (rank ordering custody preference 
“to both parents jointly or to either parent”). It also includes a presumption favoring joint custody 
when the parties agree. Id. 
 54.  Hugh McIsaac, Who Get’s the Children? Clarifying Joint Custody, L.A. TIMES, Dec 18, 1988, at 
3 (describing history of joint custody in California and 1988 statute). NOW took an active role in 
lobbying against joint-custody laws by the mid-1980s. Id. 
 55.  Id.; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(b) (West 2004). The 1988 (and current) statute expressly 
provides, “This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal 
custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the court and the family the widest discretion 
to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(c) (West 
2004). One legislator expressed regret that fathers groups were disappointed, but said, “We want what 
is best for kids, not the daddies.” See BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307.  
 56.  Testifying in favor of the bill at the hearings were representatives of the Children’s Rights 
Council (active in the 1988 legislative battle), the Family Rights Network, Men Enabling New 
Solutions, Live Beat Dads, and the Coalition of Family Support. Testimony on AB 1307 Before Assemb. 
Comm. on Judiciary, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); see also BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307.  
 57.  See BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307. Women’s groups included California NOW, the California 
Alliance Against Domestic Violence, the Feminist Majority, California Women’s Law Center, the 
national and state Business and Professional Women’s Organizations, and the Commission on the 
Status of Women. Id. 
 58.  Id. The judiciary committee ultimately declined to vote out the bill for full assembly 
consideration. Id.  
 59.  IOWA CODE § 598.41(1)(A) (2001) (requiring writing to explain why joint physical custody was 
not ordered when requested by a party). But see In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa 
2007) (holding this provision does not create a presumption favoring joint custody). A few statutes 
appear to favor joint legal custody. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009) (creating a rebuttable 
presumption favoring joint legal custody when a parent requests); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1) (2012) 
(directing that joint custody be encouraged “when appropriate”). Margaret Brinig finds this change to 
have a modest impact on custody orders. She concludes that the statute functions as a penalty default 
that parties bargain around. Margaret Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child 
Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 811–12 (2006).  
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groups.60 These reforms, no doubt, have influenced courts in some states to be 
more receptive to joint custody and perhaps to fathers’ claims generally.61 But 
the most important goal of fathers’ advocates is a statutory presumption 
directing that fathers and mothers have equal time with their children, and this 
prize has eluded them in most states.62 In response to the intense political battle 
between mothers’ and fathers’ advocates, legislatures have declined to enact a 
custody rule favoring joint physical custody and have retained the best-interests 
standard instead. 
B. The Politics of Motherhood 
This account of the political battles over joint custody sheds some light on 
the durability of the best-interests standard, but it also raises further questions. 
Women’s advocates have played a key role in resisting joint-custody reforms, 
but why have they done so little to promote the legislative enactment of a rule 
more favorable to mothers? Feminist scholars have emphasized the deficiencies 
of the best-interests standard and argued that mothers are disadvantaged in 
custody adjudications under contemporary law.63 Many feminists strongly favor 
a preference for the primary caretaker, which is also endorsed by women’s 
organizations.64 But promoting this reform has not been a priority for mothers’ 
advocates.65 Instead, their efforts to influence custody law have been directed 
toward resisting joint-custody initiatives, promoting strong domestic-violence 
 
 60.  See infra text accompanying notes 106–107 (discussing these policies and friendly-parent 
provisions). A substantial majority of state statutes include these provisions favoring contact with both 
parents. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY STATE 
(2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Custody. 
authcheckdam.pdf.  
 61.  But see Brinig, supra note 59 (finding many couples opt out of joint custody; also finding 
increase in domestic-violence claims when laws endorse substantial contact with both parents).  
 62.  A few states have statutory presumptions favoring shared physical parenting. See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. § 61.13 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (2006) (not 
requiring equal time). But fathers’ advocates claim many more. See Testimony on AB 1307 Before 
Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (statement of Rep. Mervyn 
Dymally) (rejecting the assertion that the bill was a radical reform, suggesting that eleven states had 
similar laws). This exaggeration might represent an effort to persuade legislatures that joint custody 
represents an emerging trend. Some ambiguity is created by statutes that do not distinguish clearly 
between legal and physical custody. Idaho, Iowa, and Texas, often described as states with joint-custody 
presumptions, favor joint legal custody but not equal residential time. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-
717B (2009); IOWA CODE § 598.41(1)(A) (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131 (West 2008).  
 63.  See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 
38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991); Martha Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031 (2001); Nancy Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing? 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
235 (1982).  
 64.  See Domestic Relations, NOW-N.Y. ST., http://www.nownys.org/domesticrel.html (last visited 
on Nov. 5, 2012). This web page includes a mission statement that it supports legislation requiring that 
custody be awarded to the primary caregiver. This statement is not presented on the main NOW web 
page and is not elaborated. 
 65.  Id. NOW has devoted far more energy to fighting joint-custody initiatives and promoting 
domestic-violence presumptions. Women’s groups undertook a modest unsuccessful effort to enact the 
preference in California in 1988 as part of battle over joint custody. See McIsaac, supra note 54. 
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presumptions and permissive relocation rules, and seeking to discredit and 
exclude parental alienation as a relevant factor.66 
The reasons for this seeming disinterest in reforming the best-interests 
standard are likely complex. Women’s organizations such as NOW might view 
the primary-caretaker preference as a “hard sell” politically because, given 
contemporary family roles, it clearly favors mothers, despite its formal gender 
neutrality.67 In contrast, fathers’ interest groups can promote a joint–physical 
custody presumption as grounded in gender equality. But it is also likely that 
advocates for mothers are simply not as dissatisfied with the best-interests 
standard as are fathers and their supporters. To be clear, mothers groups 
protest the failure of courts deciding custody disputes to recognize domestic-
violence claims and judges’ willingness to consider (what they view as bogus) 
alienation evidence.68 But, mothers’ supporters simply do not express the kind 
of pervasive bitterness about custody outcomes under the best-interests 
standard that has energized fathers and fueled the joint-custody movement. 
Indeed, in the political battle over joint custody, mothers’ advocates have 
aligned with judges and attorney groups in defending the discretionary best-
interests standard.69 For example, mothers’ groups in Minnesota did not oppose 
the 1989 legislation abolishing a judicially created primary-caretaker standard 
and reinstating the best-interests standard.70 Further, a statewide survey of 
family-law attorneys found strong support for the view that judges tend to favor 
mothers in custody proceedings (and little support for the view that they favor 
fathers).71 This evidence is far from conclusive, but it does suggest that mothers 
 
 66.  NOW, along with regional groups such as the California Alliance Against Domestic Violence, 
have actively lobbied against joint-custody bills. See supra note 50 and sources cited therein. Domestic-
violence groups have also challenged the judicial emphasis on parental alienation as harmful to victims. 
See Irene Weiser, The Truth about Parental Alienation, PLEASE JUDGE, NO, http://pleasejudgeno.com/ 
PAS__The_Truth.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). California women’s groups supported bills aimed at 
limiting the admissibility of evidence of parental-alienation syndrome (PAS). See Child Custody 
Evaluation Changes, CAL. ALLIANCE FOR FAMILIES & CHILDREN, http://www.cafcusa.org/ 
child_custody_evaluations.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) (fathers’ group describing and criticizing the 
campaign to limit admissibility of PAS evidence).  
 67.  In Minnesota, a key argument in favor of legislative abolition of primary-caretaker preference 
was that the preference was unfair to fathers. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the 
Child, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 494 n.227 (1990).  
 68.  See Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding 
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657 (2003) 
(analyzing why domestic violence is discounted by courts deciding custody); supra note 66 (describing 
opposition to PAS evidence). 
 69.  In opposing joint-custody legislation, mothers’ organizations have advocated for retaining the 
discretionary standard. See Testimony on AB 1307 Before Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2005–2006 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS, AB 1307 (Cal. 2005), 
available at ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_1301-
1350/ab_1307_cfa_20050502_142229_asm_comm.html.  
 70.  See Crippen, supra note 67.  
 71.  OREGON SUPREME COURT/OREGON STATE BAR TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS, 
GENDER EQUITY SURVEY OF LAWYERS: SURVEY RESULTS 7 (1997) [hereinafter GENDER EQUITY 
SURVEY OF LAWYERS], available at https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/ 
1026/GENDER%20Lawyer%20Full%20Report.pdf?sequence=5 (more domestic-relations lawyers 
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in general fare relatively well in custody proceedings and their advocates in the 
political arena do not see the need for dramatic reform of the best-interests 
standard. 
The intense focus on domestic violence might also have diverted attention 
from other concerns that are perceived to be less urgent than the need to 
protect women and their children in custody disputes. Mothers’ groups link 
virtually all custody initiatives to domestic violence, including the opposition to 
joint custody and to friendly-parent provisions.72 Indeed, many active opponents 
of joint custody are groups primarily concerned with domestic violence, rather 
than with broader women’s issues.73 Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
gender war over custody law is sometimes characterized by politicians as a 
battle between men’s groups and anti–domsetic violence advocates.74 
C. Legislative Response to Gender Politics 
The thirty-year gender war over custody has resulted in a political-economy 
deadlock that has likely contributed to the entrenchment of the best-interests 
standard. Legislatures have declined to act, in part, because each of the two 
more precise rules that have substantial political support is perceived as 
favoring either fathers or mothers and is therefore unacceptable to a powerful 
interest group that is ready to battle against enactment. This is the lesson of the 
struggle by fathers’ groups to enact joint-custody legislation, and no one doubts 
that efforts by mothers’ advocates to enact a primary-caretaker preference 
would face similarly fierce resistance. Under these conditions, legislatures 
considering the enactment of either custody rule can anticipate high political 
costs. Thus, interest-group competition has likely led to legislative inaction, an 
outcome reinforced by continuing support for the best-interests standard by 
judges and attorneys—respected nonpartisans in the gender war. 
The absence of significant legislative movement to replace the best-interests 
standard is compatible with observations of political scientists and legal scholars 
who study the political economy of lawmaking. Public-choice theory suggests 
that when the political costs of enacting a rule are high, legislatures will 
sometimes opt for a vague standard, delegating to courts the task of providing 
 
surveyed find judicial bias against fathers (70% agree) than mothers (5% agree) in custody 
proceedings); see also WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS TASK FORCE ON GENDER 
FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE 
COURTS 50–57 (1996) (finding that mothers are awarded custody under primary-caretaker statute when 
care is evenly divided).  
 72.  See Amy Levin & Linda Mills, Fighting for Child Custody When Domestic Violence is an Issue, 
48 SOC. WORK 463 (2003) (arguing that abusers seek joint custody to gain access to victims and that 
women must be free to oppose this arrangement); see also Weiser, supra note 66 (linking of PAS and 
domestic violence authored by NOW leader).  
 73.  See Weiser, supra note 66. 
 74.  See Hearing on SB 243 and SB 244 Before Sen. Comm. on Bus., L. & Gov’t, 1997 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Or. 1997) (statement of Bill Howe, Chair, Oregon Task Force on Family Law) [hereinafter 
Hearing on SB 243 and SB 244] (emphasizing that the legislature must not adopt the views of interest 
groups).  
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legal content in individual cases.75 Advocacy groups are more likely to mobilize 
when legislation clearly impacts their interests than when outcomes are 
uncertain. In the realm of custody legislation, the contrast between the smooth 
enactment of statutes embodying the best-interests standard in the 1970s and 
1980s and the more recent battles over joint custody is instructive. The former 
appear to have generated little political controversy.76 Who could be offended 
by the innocuous expression of a benign policy goal accompanied by a list of 
factors for judicial consideration? In contrast, the struggles over joint custody 
suggest the difficulties in accomplishing collective legislative action on 
contested issues. In the face of organized opposition, lawmakers might be 
inclined to punt, enacting or retaining a vague standard and delegating hard 
decisions to courts. 
IV 
DEFINING BEST INTERESTS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND PARENTAL 
ALIENATION 
The gender war over custody has also played out in battles between 
mothers’ and fathers’ advocates over the content of the best-interests standard 
itself—with greater success on both sides. Mothers’ advocates have effectively 
promoted statutory provisions categorically disfavoring the parent who has 
violently threatened either his77 child or the other parent.78 In response, fathers’ 
groups have sought to weaken these laws while urging lawmakers (also 
successfully) to emphasize parental alienation as a key factor in the custody 
decision.79 Both domestic violence and alienation implicate core policies of 
modern custody law. The importance of prohibiting an abusive or violent 
parent from obtaining custody is self-evident, but parental alienation is also 
linked to a key policy goal—the promotion of both parents’ continued 
involvement with the child after divorce.80 In recent years, domestic-violence 
claims by mothers and alienation claims by fathers have assumed prominence in 
 
 75.  Public-choice theory predicts that where competing interest groups advocate for and against 
legislation, legislatures will either favor no bill or delegate regulation to agencies or courts, rather than 
incurring the wrath of one of the opposing groups. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, PHILLIP FRICKEY & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY, 58–60 (4th ed. 2007).  
 76.  The 1989 adoption of the Minnesota best-interests standard, promoted by fathers groups, was 
uniformly supported by the Minnesota Bar Association and faced little opposition by women’s groups. 
See Crippen, supra note 67, at 227.  
 77.  The male pronoun is used to describe perpetrators of domestic violence not because only 
males engage in this behavior, but because mothers’ groups have advocated for strong domestic 
violence laws and fathers’ groups have opposed them. 
 78.  More than half of the states have rebuttable presumptions explicitly disfavoring granting 
custody to an abuser (passed in response to lobbying by mothers’ groups); other states include domestic 
violence as a factor to be taken into account in granting custody. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, 
supra note 60.   
 79.  See infra text accompanying notes 105, 156. 
 80.  See infra text accompanying note 109.   
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custody adjudications,81 often trumping other evidence offered by the parties. 
On first inspection, these reforms seem like positive developments that 
could mitigate the deficiencies of the best-interests standard by bringing 
determinacy to important categories of cases in which particular bad behavior 
should presumptively disqualify a parent from custody.82 But as we show in the 
discussion that follows, domestic-violence and (particularly) parental-alienation 
claims themselves are very difficult for courts to evaluate. Because of this 
uncertainty, and because these factors are weighed so heavily in custody 
decisions, parents may be motivated to bring marginal claims and courts may be 
unable to distinguish these claims from legitimate allegations. 
A. The Domestic-Violence Presumption 
Over the past generation, legislatures in most states have enacted laws 
emphasizing that acts of domestic violence warrant special attention in custody 
decisions. Physical abuse of a child has long been a key consideration in 
deciding custody, but until recently, violence toward a spouse or partner was 
not presumed to be of particular importance to the child’s welfare.83 This 
changed as advocates argued persuasively that exposure to violence in the home 
harms children, whether they are targeted or not.84 Today most custody statutes 
direct that a parent who has engaged in acts or threats of violence against either 
a child or the other parent is presumed to be unsuitable for custody.85 These 
 
 81.  See James Bow, Jonathon Gould & James Flens, Examining Parental Alienation in Child 
Custody Cases: A Survey of Mental Health and Legal Professionals, 37 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY (2009) 
(estimating that thirty percent of cases involve parental-alienation claims); Peter Jaffe, Claire Crooks & 
Samantha Poisson, Common Misconceptions in Addressing Domestic Violence in Custody Disputes, 54 
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 57, 58–59 (2003) (citing studies showing seventy-five percent of cases involve 
domestic-violence claims).  
 82.  In other legal settings governed by vague standards, doctrine often evolves over time in ways 
that increase determinacy in case outcomes. Louis Jaffe described the how courts narrow broad 
principles through precedent. Louis Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate 
Premises, 80 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1967). Custody law has also incorporated several rules that 
presumptively outweigh other factors in the application of the best-interests standard. For example, in 
some jurisdictions, the custodial preference of an older child is presumed to be dispositive. Elizabeth 
Scott, N. Dickon Reppucci & Mark Aber, Children’s Preferences in Adjudicated Custody Decisions, 22 
GA. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (1988) (describing a legal trend toward recognizing older child’s preference).  
 83. A judge in the custody dispute between O.J. Simpson and his deceased wife’s parents excluded 
evidence that he killed his wife. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 560.  
 84.  Domestic violence became an important political issue in the 1980s and 1990s, and advocates 
have been the driving force in lobbying for domestic-violence presumptions, with important support of 
law-enforcement interests. See generally JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009) (describing growing importance of 
domestic violence). Support was generated by studies indicating that perpetrators of spousal or partner 
abuse are at risk for committing child abuse as well. Robert Strauss, Supervised Visitation and Family 
Violence, 29 FAM. L.Q. 229, 237–38 (1995). Studies also showed psychological harm to children from 
exposure to violence between parents. See generally CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE 55 
(George W. Holden, Robert Geffner & Ernest N. Jouriles eds., 1998). 
 85.  See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 (West 2013) (presumption triggered by “history of, or 
potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse or kidnapping”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(9) (2012) 
(presumption triggered by “family abuse”). 
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laws create a rule within the broader best-interests standard aimed at a 
presumably small subset of cases involving violent parents.86 
A domestic-violence presumption would seem to represent a sound and 
uncontroversial proxy for best interests. Few would object to the idea that a 
parent who acts violently toward his child or partner is unsuitable to be his 
child’s custodian, or that evidence of serious domestic violence should trump 
other considerations in the custody decision. Moreover, a domestic-violence 
presumption avoids the evidentiary problems created by incommensurable and 
complex emotional and psychological factors when it can be established 
through concrete factual evidence of the alleged behavior. 
But often this is not possible, and evidence of domestic violence might be 
even less accessible to outsiders than evidence of other private family behavior. 
Perpetrators of child sexual abuse invariably act secretly, and children might be 
unable to provide credible accounts of the behavior. Adult victims also might be 
reluctant to disclose acts of violence even to relatives and friends when the 
family is intact. Thus, unless the perpetrator has inflicted severe injury requiring 
medical attention, or the victim, other family members, or neighbors have 
reported incidents to law-enforcement authorities, the behavior might be 
known only within the family. In many cases, the parent’s report will be the 
primary source of evidence supporting a domestic-violence claim in a custody 
dispute and the court’s decision about whether to apply the presumption will be 
based on a judgment about the claimant’s credibility and that of the parent 
denying the charge.87 Courts typically rely on psychological evaluations in 
making this determination, but as we explain below, these evaluations are also 
based largely on parents’ accounts and are of questionable reliability.88 As a 
consequence, judicial determinations might result in a great deal of error—both 
in failing to believe victims who in fact were battered or abused and in finding 
abuse where claims are exaggerated. 
The extent to which parents bring insubstantial domestic-violence claims is 
unclear. Not surprisingly, fathers’ groups argue that a high percentage of 
allegations are false,89 while mothers’ advocates insist that marginal claims are 
 
 86.  See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, supra note 60. 
 87.  A few statutes require corroborated evidence or an elevated standard of proof. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.3 (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717 (2013) (“habitual perpetrator”); IOWA 
CODE § 598.41(1) (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.24 (2011) (clear and convincing evidence); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 125.480(4)(k) (2012) (clear and convincing evidence). But most statutes have no such 
restrictions. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2004) (preponderance of evidence); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 14-10-124 (2013) (“credible evidence”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 13.705A (2009) (no 
standard); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West 2008 & Supp. 
2013) (credible evidence). 
 88.  See James N. Bow & Paul Boxer, Assessing Allegations of Domestic Violence in Custody 
Evaluations, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1394, 1394–96 (2003) (describing MHPs’ reliance on 
victims’ reports); Jaffe et al., supra note 81; Janet Johnston, Soyoung Lee, Nancy Olesen & Marjorie 
Walters, Allegations and Substantiations of Abuse in Custody-Disputing Families, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 283, 
290 (2005); infra text accompanying notes 147–149. 
 89.  See, e.g., STEPHEN BASKERVILLE, AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & CHILDREN, FAMILY 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE TRUTH ABOUT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD ABUSE 36 (2006), 
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rare.90 The truth probably lies somewhere between these poles.91 False claims 
likely are rare, but more common might be allegations based on suspicions (in 
the case of child abuse) or exaggeration of the seriousness of violent incidents 
due to distorted recollections. Thus an angry mother might erroneously 
interpret her child’s behavior and comments as providing evidence of abuse by 
the father,92 or an atypical act of aggression might be remembered as part of a 
pattern of intimidation.93 Researchers report that individuals with no history of 
violence may strike out at their spouses in the midst of marital breakdown.94 
These isolated incidents are quite different from the violence perpetrated in 
battering relationships,95 but perceptions and memories in the context of divorce 
 
available at http://www.acfc.org/acfc/assets/documents/research_pdf's/FamilyViolenceEdit.pdf (arguing 
that allegations of domestic violence in custody are either false or isolated incidents that are the 
product of divorce conflict); RICHARD A. GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR 
PARENTS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1986) [hereinafter GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY 
LITIGATION] (arguing that most sexual-abuse claims in custody proceedings are false); RADAR 
SERVICES, INC., AN EPIDEMIC OF CIVIL RIGHTS ABUSES: RANKING OF STATES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
LAWS 4 (2008), available at http://ncfm.org/libraryfiles/Children/DV/Ranking-of-States-DV-Laws.pdf 
(finding that most domestic-violence claims in divorce involve families with no history and that 
allegations of abuse are “part of the gamesmanship of divorce”).  
 90.  See Lisa Bolitan, When Parents Fight: Alaska’s Presumption Against Awarding Custody to 
Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 263, 293 (2008) (reporting evidence indicating 
that mothers seldom make false domestic-violence claims in custody disputes); Developments in the 
Law — Battered Women and Child Custody Decisionmaking, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1619 (1993) 
(arguing false allegations of domestic violence are unlikely because violent behavior produces evidence 
and children are often witnesses). The real problem, according to mothers’ groups, is that judges do not 
believe mothers’ allegations. See BATTERED MOTHERS CUSTODY CONFERENCE, 
http://www.batteredmotherscustodyconference.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). 
 91.  The most careful study found that about fifty percent of abuse claims against fathers were 
substantiated in some way (police records, witnesses, medical reports, or expert testimony). See Thea 
Brown, Fathers and Child Abuse Allegations in the Context of Parental Separation and Divorce, 41 FAM. 
CT. REV. 367 (2003); see also Johnston et al., supra note 88. But see infra text accompanying notes 145–
149 (describing problems with expert testimony). 
 92.  Research evidence indicates that child–sexual abuse claims are substantiated less frequently 
than partner-violence claims. See Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 506 (finding between twenty-three and 
forty-two percent of child–sexual abuse claims are substantiated); Johnston et al., supra note 88, at 290.  
 93.  For a description of how a spouse’s behavior and negative traits become exaggerated in the 
midst of divorce, see Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Ungerwager, Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce and 
Custody Disputes, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 451 (1991). 
 94.  The category of separation-linked violence involves isolated uncharacteristic acts of violence 
by either spouse “reacting to stress of separation or divorce in a relationship that has not otherwise 
been characterized by violence or coercive control.” Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 501. All types of 
domestic violence increase at the time of divorce. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, VIOLENCE AND THE 
FAMILY: REPORT OF THE APA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY (1996).  
 95.  Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 501. The goal of protecting victims in battering relationships 
involving an ongoing pattern of intimidation and injury has driven the legislative adoption of domestic-
violence presumptions. Researchers identify several distinct categories of domestic violence, one 
involving violence in battering relationships, and two involving separation-linked violence. See Peter 
Jaffe, Janet Johnston, Claire Crooks & Nicholas Bala, Custody Disputes Involving Allegations of 
Domestic Violence: Toward a Differentiated Approach to Parenting Plans, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 500, 500–
01 (2008) (describing several categories and citing studies finding these categories); Michael P. Johnson, 
Apples and Oranges in Child Custody Disputes: Intimate Terrorism vs. Situational Couple Violence, 2 J. 
CHILD CUSTODY, no. 4, 2005, at 43; Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence: 
Implications for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379 (2005). 
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can be unreliable. Domestic-violence allegations are pervasive in this setting.96 
Some advocates argue almost all custody disputes involve a violent parent, 
which seems unlikely.97 The evidence is scant but it suggests that parents 
sometimes bring marginal claims.98 
It is easy to see how this might happen. Under the best-interests standard, 
the outcome of custody adjudication is uncertain and a presumption that trumps 
other factors provides a powerful advantage. An attorney representing a 
mother appropriately will probe whether her client or the client’s child has been 
a victim of family violence, and will present any credible evidence that might 
persuade the court to apply the presumption to the case.99 Under these 
conditions, it would be surprising if marginal claims were not advanced.100 
What harm is incurred if parents sometimes offer marginal domestic-
violence claims? This practice might potentially create two kinds of harm 
beyond mundane administrative costs. First, courts might wrongly apply the 
presumption, to the detriment of good fathers and their children. A finding of 
domestic violence can influence the outcome beyond the determination of 
which parent is awarded custody; it also often results in restrictions on a 
parent’s access to the child.101 This is appropriate when serious violence is 
accurately verified, but not if the finding is erroneous. 
 
 
 96.  See Bow & Boxer, supra note 88, at 1396 (reporting allegations in 72%–80% of cases); Jaffe et 
al., supra note 81 (reporting allegations in 75% of cases); Garland Waller, Biased Family Court System 
Hurts Mothers, WOMEN’S ENEWS, INC. (Sept. 5, 2001), http://womensenews.org/story/commentary/ 
010905/biased-family-court-system-hurts-mothers#.Ukoa2Rz8dv0 (reporting allegations in 70% of 
contested cases); Weiser & Pappas, supra note 50 (reporting allegations in 80% of cases).  
 97.  See Letter from the Family Violence Intervention Steering Committee for Multnomah County 
to the Oregon Task Force on Family Law (1997) (arguing for presumption that all adjudicated custody 
cases involve violence). 
 98.  A survey of domestic-relations attorneys representing both men and women found that a 
majority thought that marginal claims of domestic violence were sometimes raised in custody cases. See 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL COMM., OREGON JUDICIAL DEP’T, GENDER FAIRNESS 2002, at 53–55 
(2002), available at http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/docs/osca/cpsd/courtimprovement/access/gftf/ 
gf2002.pdf. The problem might be greater when the father seeks joint custody and is opposed by the 
mother. Margaret Brinig found that domestic-violence claims by mothers increased significantly in 
response to Oregon legislation favorable to joint custody. Brinig argues that mothers claimed domestic 
violence to avoid application of a new law. See Brinig, supra note 59, at 804, 810. Even sympathetic 
observers acknowledge that the salience of domestic violence to custody might encourage false or 
marginal claims. See Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 508; see also William Austin, Assessing Credibility in 
Allegations of Marital Violence in High-Conflict Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. 
REV. 462 (2000) (suggesting that claiming domestic violence creates a strategic advantage and 
expressing concern over false claims).  
 99.  If claims were readily verifiable, marginal claims would be deterred. For example, if a 
presumption favored the taller or shorter parent, strategic use would be difficult (but the presumption 
would be a bad best-interests proxy).  
 100.  A 1990s study (conducted at a time when domestic-violence claims were likely less common 
than they are today) indicated that judges tended to favor the parent alleging spousal abuse, even if the 
claim was not substantiated. See Bow & Boxer, supra note 88, at 1397.  
 101.  Under many statutes, parents found to have perpetrated domestic violence are restricted to 
supervised visitation or excluded from contact with their children altogether. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
9-3 (2011); IND. CODE § 1-17-2-8.3 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.191(2) (2011).  
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A second cost is more speculative, but also potentially troubling: Courts 
confronted with frequent claims of family violence in custody disputes 
(including some that appear to be marginal or even spurious) might come to 
adopt a skeptical stance, rejecting not only false allegations but legitimate 
claims as well. If so, the insistence by mothers’ advocates that judges tend to be 
unsympathetic to these claims might be accurate.102 Experience with claims of 
child sexual abuse in the 1990s suggests that courts may become somewhat 
skeptical in response to ubiquitous allegations supported by weak evidence.103 
A presumption that a violent parent should not be awarded custody is a rule 
supported by important policy interests that potentially can resolve an 
important category of disputes without requiring difficult comparisons with 
other evidence. However, the ability of courts to verify domestic-violence 
claims is uncertain because the information is often private; this informational 
asymmetry encourages marginal claims that, under current legal formulations,104 
threaten to undermine the utility of the presumption. 
B. Parental Alienation as a Response 
As family violence emerged as a key factor in custody adjudication in the 
1980s, advocates for fathers responded by promoting the importance of parental 
alienation, often claiming that domestic-violence allegations were part of a 
pattern of alienation. These efforts have been effective, partly due to 
proponents’ success in linking parental alienation to custody law’s strongly 
articulated policy of encouraging both parents’ continued involvement in their 
children’s lives after family dissolution.105 This policy goal has been advanced 
 
 102.  See Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family and the Lawyering Process: Lessons 
from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1993) (describing bias against domestic-
violence claimants in family-law cases); Mildred Daley Pagelow, Justice for Victims of Spouse Abuse in 
Divorce and Child Custody Cases, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 69 (1993); Jay G. Silverman et al., Child 
Custody Decisions in Cases Involving Intimate Partner Violence: A Human Rights Analysis, 94 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 951, 953 (2004). 
 103.  The evidence is suggestive. In the 1980s and 1990s, many custody disputes involved sexual-
abuse allegations, often supported by MHP testimony. See Alan Klein, Forensic Issues in Sexual Abuse 
Allegations in Custody/Visitation Litigation, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 247 (1994). This psychological 
evidence was challenged not only by fathers’ advocates, see, e.g., GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY 
LITIGATION, supra note 89 (noting most sexual abuse claims in custody disputes are false), but also by 
neutral observers, see, e.g., Johnston et al., supra note 88 (describing low rate of substantiated child–
sexual abuse claims); Robert Levy, Using Scientific Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. 
L.Q. 383 (1989). Today these allegations are raised less frequently, while claims of partner violence 
have increased dramatically. Elizabeth S. Scott, Survey of Child–Sexual Abuse and Domestic-Violence 
Allegations in Custody Disputes (July 2011) (on file with authors). Fathers’ advocacy groups currently 
also focus on false allegations of domestic violence. AM. COAL. FOR FATHERS & CHILDREN, 
http://www.acfc.org (last visited May 21, 2014) (home page describing research compilation on false 
claims of domestic violence). 
 104.  In part V, we propose reforms that might improve judges’ ability to evaluate domestic-violence 
claims.  
 105.  Other reforms promoting this goal include the requirement of parenting plans and the 
expanded parental authority of noncustodial parents. See Elizabeth Scott, Parental Autonomy and 
Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1073 n.9, 1081 (2003) [hereinafter Scott, Parental 
Autonomy].  
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through statutory friendly-parent provisions directing courts to encourage 
cooperation by considering the extent to which each parent supports the other’s 
relationship with the child.106 Although lawmakers viewed these measures as 
creating positive incentives for parents,107 their primary impact has been to 
elevate the importance of parental alienation as an extreme form of 
noncooperation. 
In contrast to domestic violence, no formal legal presumption disfavors the 
hostile parent, or provides a trump to the parent demonstrating alienation. 
Nonetheless, over the past generation courts have assigned great importance to 
this custody factor.108 This is due partly to the efforts of fathers’ advocates, but 
also to MHPs urging the importance of alienation through expert testimony in 
custody proceedings. Indeed, the prominence of alienation is due in part to the 
relentless efforts of psychologist Richard Gardner, who in the 1980s identified 
“parental alienation syndrome” (PAS) based on his observation of divorcing 
fathers wrongly accused (in his view) by hostile mothers of abusing their 
children.109 Many experts follow Gardner in framing the alienating parent’s 
conduct as a mental disorder, but even those who do not endorse the 
“syndrome” diagnosis view alienation as a critically important issue in 
evaluating best interests.110 Thus, a parent whose child is withdrawn or hostile 
toward him has reason to expect that expert testimony on alienation will count 
heavily in his favor. As with domestic violence, the importance assigned to this 
factor encourages marginal claims. Because only the most acrimonious parents 
typically adjudicate custody, alienation claims are ubiquitous.111 
Like domestic-violence allegations, charges of alienation rest on private 
family information that might be difficult for a court to verify; indeed, courts 
might be unable to even assess the source of a child’s hostility toward a parent. 
But parental-alienation claims are also problematic for another reason. 
Currently, we simply lack the scientific knowledge to determine whether anger 
 
 106.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 2004) (weighing “which parent is more likely to allow the child 
. . . frequent and continuing contact with the non-custodial parent”). At least thirty-two states have a 
friendly-parent provision of some kind. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, supra note 60.  
 107.  Bill Howe, Chair of an Oregon family-law task force, argued that a friendly-parent provision 
would create beneficial incentives for parents. “You score points by explaining how you will encourage 
the relationship with the other parent.” Hearing on SB 243 and SB 244, supra note 74 (statement of Bill 
Howe, Chair, Oregon Task Force on Family Law).  
 108.  See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 663–64; Scott, Parental Autonomy, supra note 105. 
Alienation claims are also important in relocation cases. See In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 
(Cal. 2004).  
 109.  See generally RICHARD GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A GUIDE FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (2nd ed. 1998) [hereinafter GARDNER, THE 
PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME]. Richard Gardner offers a comprehensive treatment of PAS and 
an argument for its relevance to custody disputes. Id. But see infra text accompanying note 112 
(discussing lack of scientific basis for PAS).  
 110.  See Bow, Gould & Flens, supra note 81 (finding alienation to be among the two or three most 
important custody factors).  
 111.  Studies have found about thirty-five percent of adjudicated cases involve alienation claims. See 
id.  
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directed toward a parent in the context of divorce is entrenched or transitory, or 
to evaluate the benefit (or cost) of awarding custody to the estranged parent.112 
Even though alienation is grounded in a legitimate objective of custody law—to 
promote both parents’ future involvement in their child’s life—it has no 
scientific basis as a factor for determining best interests. 
An alienation claim may have particular salience when the other parent 
alleges domestic violence. In fact, many custody disputes play out as gender 
battles in which courts are presented with competing claims of domestic 
violence and parental alienation. Often, one kind of evidence is introduced to 
counter and nullify the other.113 Thus, a father might introduce evidence of 
parental alienation to persuade the court that the mother’s allegation of 
violence is not merely false, but pathological.114 In turn, a mother who is 
targeted with alienation charges can explain her hostile attitude as grounded in 
genuine fear of the father’s abusive conduct and her consequent need to protect 
her child.115 Sometimes these claims are valid—and most likely are honest. But 
the importance of these factors—already key under contemporary custody 
law—has been amplified, and it is also at least plausible that their strategic use 
has increased because the factors have been enlisted as competing weapons in 
the ground war between mothers and fathers over custody. 
In theory, the emergence of domestic violence and parental alienation as 
key custody factors seems to represent progress toward a more satisfactory legal 
framework for resolving custody disputes. The success of advocates for mothers 
and fathers in establishing the importance of these issues may have allayed their 
concerns about the vagueness and uncertainty of the best-interests standard. 
Moreover, the factors themselves embody important policy objectives and 
might guide courts in resolving two important categories of cases. In general, 
 
 112.  See Carol Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome and Alienated Children — Getting it Wrong in 
Child Custody Cases, 35 FAM. L.Q. 527 (2001) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the deficiencies 
of PAS). 
 113.  PAS was conceived in part to provide a defensive weapon for fathers in custody battles 
involving domestic-violence claims. See supra text accompanying note 109 (discussing development of 
PAS by Richard Gardner, who believed fathers in custody disputes were wrongly accused of domestic 
violence). A survey of family lawyers and MHPs involved in custody assessments found reports of 
thirty-five percent of cases involving both alienation and domestic-violence claims and of twenty-nine 
percent involving both child abuse and alienation. Bow, Gould & Flens, supra note 81. Many judicial 
opinions feature both claims. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.H. & Y.A., No. A120227, 2009 WL 2106145, 
at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 17, 2009) (father awarded custody because mother demonized father to the 
children); Smith v. Smith, No. FA010341470S, 2003 WL 21774003, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 15, 
2003) (father claimed that he should get sole custody because his wife had alienated his son from him, 
claiming abuse); Schumaker v. Schumaker, 931 So. 2d 271, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (mother 
claimed domestic violence; father in response claimed alienation); Renaud v. Renaud, 721 A.2d 463, 
465 (Vt. 1998) (mother claimed abuse of child, which psychiatric experts challenged; father claimed 
alienation); see also Janet Johnston, Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and Refuse Visitation: 
Recent Research and Social Policy Implications, 38 FAM. L.Q. 757, 758 (2005) (showing that reasons why 
some children do not want a relationship with one parent are complex). 
 114.  GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME, supra note 109.  
 115.  Domestic-violence advocates argue that parental-alienation claims are used to discount 
children’s legitimate fears in violent family situations. See Weiser, supra note 66. 
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these benefits might have diminished frustration with the application of the 
best-interests standard and contributed to its durability. 
For the benefits of greater determinacy to be realized, however, judges must 
be able to accurately adjudicate domestic-violence and alienation claims and, as 
we have shown, this is often extremely difficult. Nonetheless, judges frequently 
consider these claims, apparently without complaining that the assignment 
exceeds their capacities. In the next part, we describe how judges turn to MHPs 
to assist them in assessing domestic-violence and alienation allegations and, 
more generally, in evaluating best interests and advising them on custody 
decisions. 
V 
THE ILLUSION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERTISE IN RESOLVING CUSTODY 
DISPUTES 
The political-economy deadlock provides only a partial explanation for the 
entrenchment of the best-interests standard. Also important is judges’ and 
attorneys’ apparent satisfaction with the custody standard: Both groups have 
opposed joint-custody laws, arguing that courts must be afforded broad 
discretion to consider the circumstances of each custody dispute.116 To an extent, 
judges may simply enjoy the broad discretionary authority afforded by a vague 
standard (and it may create greater demand for attorneys’ services). But courts’ 
routine practice of consulting with psychologists and other MHPs117 to assist 
them in applying the best-interests standard118 has obscured the rule’s 
deficiencies and likely dampened frustration with its application. Although 
judges are unlikely to speak in these terms, they seem to believe that these 
experts have the skill to obtain private family information and assess its 
credibility, and the knowledge to evaluate and compare factors for determining 
best interests. Thus, in most custody proceedings, MHPs play a critical role as 
neutral experts whose opinions are sought by courts and whose 
recommendations often determine custody arrangements, either as the basis of 
the court order or as the impetus for parents’ agreement.119 
 
 
 116.  In the 2005 legislative battle over joint custody in California, a representative of the family-law 
section of the state bar opposed the “cookie cutter” approach of a joint-custody presumption and 
articulated the standard rationale for retaining a vague standard to resolve custody decisions. “Judicial 
discretion is necessary in custody matters because . . . families are different. This difference requires 
different custody orders tailored to fit the specific family and the needs of the children.” See Testimony 
on AB 1307 Before Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).  
 117.  Our criticism applies with equal force to psychologists and other MHPs (mostly psychiatrists 
and clinical social workers) who serve as experts in custody disputes. But only psychologists administer 
and interpret (what we view as inappropriate) psychological tests. See infra text accompanying note 
134.  
 118.  See Daniel Shuman, The Role of Mental Health Experts in Custody Decisions: Science, 
Psychological Tests and Clinical Judgment, 36 FAM. L.Q. 135, 157–58 (2002) (discussing the growing use 
of court-appointed experts in custody cases). 
 119.  See infra text accompanying notes 120–127.  
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This delegation of judicial function to mental-health experts is deeply 
problematic. These professionals might be better positioned than judges to 
acquire private family information and they can sometimes assist courts by 
offering observations about family functioning or parental pathology. But 
MHPs are not experts in assessing credibility. Moreover, they lack the scientific 
knowledge to guide them in linking clinical observations or test data to 
qualitative proxies for best interests or in comparing incommensurable factors 
to make custody recommendations to the court. A part of the problem is that 
the rules that generally restrict the admissibility of scientific evidence in legal 
proceedings are often not applied to custody proceedings, and judges tend to be 
uncritical in assessing the quality of the opinions of court-appointed experts. 
Were the standard evidentiary screen applied, most psychological evidence that 
currently forms the basis of custody decisions (including expert testimony on 
domestic violence and alienation) would be excluded and the deficiencies of the 
best-interests standard would likely be clearer. 
A. The Role of Mental-Health Experts in Resolving Custody Disputes 
The influence of MHPs in shaping custody decisions is linked to two 
dimensions of their role that distinguish them from experts in other legal 
proceedings: Their input is solicited by the court120 and they are invited to offer 
opinions on the ultimate legal issue.121 Of course, parents, like litigants in other 
legal proceedings, can introduce psychological testimony in support of their 
respective claims. But opinions of party experts may be seen as biased,122 
whereas MHPs who perform custody evaluations as neutral experts are 
presumed credible and their opinions carry substantial weight.123 
 
 120.  Courts have the authority to appoint experts under the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R. 
EVID. 706, and under some state statutes, but seldom exercise this authority. John Wiley, Taming 
Patent, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1429–31 (2002). One reason cited is relevant to custody proceedings: 
concern about experts’ neutrality. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 
665 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he judge cannot be confident that the expert whom he has picked is a genuine 
neutral.”). 
 121.  In general, ultimate-issue testimony by experts is problematic because it usurps the fact 
finder’s function. See Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 n.10 (9th Cir. 
2002) (excluding ultimate-issue testimony on this basis); JOHN CONLEY & JANE MORIARTY, 
SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 110 (2007). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not require 
exclusion of ultimate-issue testimony if the evidence would otherwise be admissible. FED. R. EVID. 704. 
We will argue that ultimate-issue testimony in custody proceedings should be disallowed under this 
provision. 
 122.  Commentators argue that evaluators working for one party are so handicapped by their 
position that the party-expert practice should be avoided for both scientific and ethical reasons. See 
Lois Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, Psychological Evaluations in Divorce Custody: Problems, Principles 
and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES 
AND EXPERTISE 157, 162–65 (Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987). 
 123.  See Shuman, supra note 118, at 160 (arguing that the role of psychologists “is being 
transformed from expert as expert to expert as judge”); see also James Bow & Francella Quinnell, 
Critique of Child Custody Evaluations by the Legal Profession, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 115, 121 (2004) 
(finding that eighty-four percent of judges and eighty-six percent of attorneys wanted evaluators to 
make specific custody recommendations). 
3_SCOTT & EMERY_EIC (RECOVERED) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014  9:39 AM 
No. 1 2014] GENDER POLITICS AND CHILD CUSTODY 93 
MHPs’ recommendations influence custody outcomes in several ways. First 
and most obviously, courts typically request that MHPs make specific 
recommendations regarding the custody arrangement that will promote the 
child’s best interests,124 and judges usually follow the advice offered by court-
appointed experts.125 But beyond their direct influence on courts, MHPs’ 
opinions also influence parents’ decisions to settle their disputes. Neutral-
evaluation reports are commonly shared with the parties prior to the custody 
hearing, in part to encourage a settlement in accord with the expert’s 
recommendation.126 The empirical evidence indicates that this strategy is 
effective: Evaluations lead to the settlement of a substantial proportion of cases 
that otherwise appear to be destined for litigation.127 
MHPs have assumed this expansive and unusual role as experts in custody 
proceedings because courts have encouraged them to do so. In the face of 
daunting challenges in applying the legal standard, judges enlist MHPs to guide 
them in evaluating the parties’ claims and to offer an opinion on the ultimate 
issue of what allocation of custody between the parents will promote the child’s 
best interests. But in doing so, courts are asking more of mental-health experts 
than they are capable of producing on the basis of their expertise. 
B. Analyzing the Custody-Evaluation Process: The General Critique 
A well-trained MHP might play a useful but limited role in providing the 
court with information derived from a clinical family evaluation.128 Mental-
health experts are trained to conduct interviews of individuals regarding 
intimate matters and to observe behavior and interactions, some of which might 
be relevant to custody. They also have the opportunity to interact with families 
in a setting that is more conducive to acquiring information than is possible in a 
courtroom. Moreover, MHPs can diagnose established mental illnesses on the 
basis of observed behavior; thus, a psychologist can inform the court that a 
parent suffers from depression, schizophrenia, or a serious substance-abuse 
 
 124.  See Bow & Quinnell, supra note 123. 
 125.  MHP recommendations are highly predictive of custody outcomes. See Emery et al., A Critical 
Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations, supra note 16; Steven Erickson, Scott Lilienfeld & Michael 
Vitacco, A Critical Examination of the Suitability and Limitations of Psychological Tests in Family 
Court, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 157 (2007); Shuman, supra note 118. 
 126.  See Shuman, supra note 118, at 159.  
 127.  Id. at 158; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 137–40 (1992) (describing settlement postevaluation). A 
relatively new dispute resolution process, “early neutral evaluation,” has the explicit goal of promoting 
settlement. Couples litigating custody are offered a brief, confidential, and relatively inexpensive MHP 
evaluation, after which the evaluator discloses her tentative custody recommendation. See generally 
Jordan Santeramo, Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 321 (2004) (reporting 
a high settlement rate).  
 128.  The typical custody evaluation includes clinical interviews of parents and children, 
observations of parent–child interactions, psychological testing of both parents and children, and, 
sometimes, a review of medical and psychological records and contact with teachers and other 
professionals involved with the family. See generally JONATHAN GOULD & DAVID MARTINDALE, THE 
ART AND SCIENCE OF CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS (2007).  
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problem. But even in this limited role, clinicians’ performance might be 
hampered in custody evaluations in ways that do not arise in other clinical 
settings. Much of the information on which MHPs rely comes from contesting 
parents who are motivated to create a positive impression and disclose only 
information useful to their claims. Psychological training does not provide the 
tools to obtain accurate and complete private information from parents or to 
assess its credibility.129 
Moreover, many MHPs do not limit themselves to these contributions. 
Instead, they draw inferences from their objective observations to reach 
psychological conclusions about family members and their relationships with 
one another. Based on those conclusions, they sometimes offer predictions and 
assessments relevant to custody, and often an opinion about the custody 
decision itself. This input routinely involves the evaluation of qualitative factors 
such as the closeness of the parent–child relationship, parental competence, and 
alienation.130 But social scientists have questioned whether the evaluators in 
most custody cases have the expertise to contribute input beyond observations 
and established diagnoses.131 These critics argue that psychologists violate both 
scientific norms and professional ethical standards when they offer opinions 
based on the typical evaluation process.132 
This questionable inferential process is deployed in several ways to support 
opinions that rest on uncertain or illusory science. First, many MHPs use 
clinical observations to make speculative predictions and substantiate favored 
diagnoses or constructs that are without scientific foundation.133 MHPs bolster 
their conclusions with findings from psychological tests that are a core element 
of most custody evaluations. These tests carry an aura of scientific objectivity, 
but, as critics have demonstrated, add little to the clinical evaluation.134 Further, 
 
 129.  MHPs might have a slight advantage over judges in this regard, but extensive research reveals 
only minor differences in the ability to detect lies based on professional training or other qualities. See 
generally Charles Bond, Jr. & Bella DePaulo, Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy 
and Bias, 132 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477 (2008).  
 130.  Tippins and Whitman offer an example of this inferential process by describing how a 
psychologist might form a psychological opinion on a parent–child relationship: The psychologist 
observes the child clinging to his mother’s leg and concludes that he fears separation from her. Based 
on this conclusion, the expert predicts that long separations from his mother will likely cause this child 
to experience significant distress; therefore, the child should live with his mother and overnight visits 
with the father should be avoided at this time. See Tippins & Whitman, supra note 16. 
 131.  Id.; see also Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations, supra note 16; 
Erickson et al., supra note 125, at 131; Shuman, supra note 118. 
 132.  Tippins and Wittman note that a specific custody recommendation appears to violate AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT 
standard 9.02(b) (2010), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/principles/pdf, which mandates that 
“[p]sychologists use assessment instruments whose validity and reliability have been established for use 
with members of the population tested. When such validity or reliability has not been established 
psychologists [must] describe the strengths and limitations of the test results and interpretation.” See 
Tippins & Wittman, supra note 16, at 205. 
 133.  PAS is a good example of such an unsubstantiated diagnosis. See infra text accompanying 
notes 152–161.  
 134.  Psychological tests routinely employed in custody evaluations include those that are 
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mental-health evaluators routinely offer opinions about issues that are 
controversial without acknowledging the underlying scientific uncertainty.135 In 
general, psychological opinions are shaped by professional and theoretical 
perspectives and personal biases in ways that are seldom transparent.136 Finally, 
in offering opinions on the ultimate issue of how custodial responsibility should 
be divided, psychologists make a number of questionable inferential moves on 
the basis of their observations, evaluating and comparing the relative 
importance of particular factors to custody.137 Nothing in the relevant scientific 
knowledge or in clinical training provides the expertise to perform these 
functions. Not surprisingly, scientific critiques of custody evaluations uniformly 
conclude that MHPs should play a very circumscribed role in adjudication and, 
in particular, should not offer opinions on the ultimate issue of custody.138 
C. Assessing Family Violence and Parental Alienation 
As explained in part IV, many adjudicated custody disputes involve claims 
of parental alienation, domestic violence, or both,139 usually supported by the 
testimony of mental-health experts. Although claims might often be legitimate, 
the critique of psychological evaluations in custody disputes applies with as 
much force to these issues as it does more generally. At least today, 
psychological assessments of allegations of family violence and parental 
alienation raise troubling issues of scientific validity and reliability, and, 
standing alone, offer inadequate support for these claims.140 Mental-health 
experts have no greater knowledge or expertise in evaluating the credibility of 
these allegations than do judges, and in the case of parental alienation the 
construct itself is grounded in deeply flawed “science.” 
 
scientifically valid but of very limited utility in this setting (such as the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory) and those that have little or no demonstrated validity (such as the Rorschach 
inkblot test). Several authors critique the use of psychological tests in custody evaluations. See Marc 
Ackerman & Melissa Ackerman, Custody Evaluation Practice: A Survey of Experienced Professionals, 
28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 137 (1997); Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody 
Evaluations, supra note 16; Erickson et al., supra note 125, at 166.  
 135.  For example, MHPs disagree about whether infants and toddlers should have overnight 
visitation. See Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations, supra note 16, at 11. 
 136.  Thus, the evaluator’s concern about separation anxiety in Tippins and Wittman’s example, see 
supra note 130 and source cited therein, might derive from a Freudian view of mother–child 
attachment. 
 137.  See Tippins & Wittman, supra note 16, at 205 (describing an example in which the evaluator 
might compare the importance of the child’s separation anxiety to factors that weigh in favor of the 
father, for example, his greater emotional stability). 
 138.  See Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations, supra note 16; Shuman, 
supra note 118; Tippins & Wittman, supra note 16.  
 139.  See supra text accompanying note 113. 
 140.  Domestic-violence claims are often supported by police and court records, medical records, 
accounts of witnesses, and physical evidence. What is problematic is expert testimony substantiating a 
parent’s allegation on the basis of the evaluator’s conclusion that her account is credible, where other 
evidence is absent. 
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1. Family Violence 
Many domestic-violence claims are decided by courts, in part because of an 
understandable view that these allegations should be adjudicated rather than 
resolved through mediation or other forms of dispute resolution that might not 
protect victims.141 Not surprisingly, courts often turn to psychological experts for 
assistance in evaluating these claims, and often the clinician’s role is to endorse 
or challenge the alleged victim’s credibility, on which basis custody can be 
decided.142 
The evaluation of family-violence allegations is a complex business. 
Allegations of physical or sexual abuse of children are often based largely on 
evidence provided by the accusing parent, who might already be distrusting and 
suspicious of the alleged abuser. Among the frequent claims of partner violence 
in custody cases,143 some allegations likely involve the pattern of violent acts 
emblematic of a battering relationship, while others may be based on acts of 
less serious situational violence—a product of heated conflict in the midst of 
divorce.144 The latter might not be predictive of future behavior, despite victims’ 
beliefs and concerns about their severity.145 Ascertaining the nature and extent 
of violence on the basis of the alleged victim’s claim may be difficult or 
impossible absent corroborating evidence. 
Psychological experts can contribute to custody cases involving domestic 
violence by evaluating alleged victims for post-traumatic stress disorder in 
appropriate cases.146 Beyond this, MHPs have little to add to victims’ 
allegations. Although empirical efforts are underway to develop objective 
measures for assessing domestic-violence claims,147 the research is at an early 
stage. Currently, if objective external evidence is not available, custody 
evaluators must rely on participants’ reports in attempting to determine 
 
 141.  See generally Special Issue, Domestic Violence, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 431 (2008).  
 142.  See Austin, supra note 98; Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 507–08 (discussing credibility 
assessment). Some argue that custody arrangements should differ (ranging from no contact to 
coparenting) based on the potency, pattern, and identity of the primary perpetrator of domestic 
violence. See Jaffe et al., supra note 81.  
 143.  See supra note 103 and sources cited therein (discussing incidence of claims over time).  
 144.  See sources cited supra note 95 (discussing types of domestic violence). 
 145.  A growing consensus indicates that conflict-instigated or situational violence and separation 
violence are the most common categories of domestic violence, and are often reciprocal. Joan Kelly & 
Michael Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and 
Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476 (2008). But women are far more likely than men to 
be victims of violent acts causing serious injury or death. See Lois Weithorn, Protecting Children from 
Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 
13–14 n.33 (2001). 
 146.  Post-traumatic stress disorder is a recognized psychiatric diagnosis under the revised text of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-4-TR). AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 463–68 (4th 
ed., text rev. 2000).  
 147.  See Desmond Ellis & Noreen Stuckless, Domestic Violence, DOVE, and Divorce Mediation, 44 
FAM. CT. REV. 658 (2006) (discussing evidence on a new instrument, the Domestic Violence Evaluation 
(DOVE), an empirically based measure designed to assess levels of risk that grounds assessment in self-
reporting, such that it does not avoid the problem of potential bias). 
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whether a pattern of serious domestic violence exists.148 But MHPs have no 
special skill in determining the truth in a controversy that often boils down to 
“he said, she said.”149 No scientific research supports their ability to determine 
the accuracy of allegations of violence or to distinguish among different types of 
violence in an individual case on the basis of the alleged victims’ reports. 
Further, critics assert that domestic-violence evaluators are biased toward 
believing victims,150 which, if true, makes their involvement even more 
problematic. Incorrect “expert” opinions either supporting or discrediting 
domestic-violence claims can have devastating consequences. 
2. Parental-Alienation “Syndrome” 
Expert opinion on parental alienation represents the most troubling misuse 
of psychological evidence in child-custody proceedings. To be sure, the 
important policy of promoting cooperation between parents is supported by 
psychological knowledge: The research indicates that exposure to severe 
conflict between parents is harmful to children’s adjustment after divorce.151 But 
expert testimony on parental alienation typically is not based on this 
knowledge. Instead, as discussed above, parental alienation emerged as a key 
issue in custody proceedings in part through the efforts of psychologist Richard 
Gardner, who “discovered” PAS and labeled it a psychiatric disorder.152 His 
work and advocacy for PAS have been highly influential with custody 
evaluators (even those who reject the syndrome diagnosis)153 and indirectly with 
courts.154 According to one survey, experienced evaluators listed alienation as 
the second most important factor in child-custody evaluations (following only a 
 
 148.  See Austin, supra note 98.  
 149.  Victims’ advocates recognize that there is often little extrinsic evidence to corroborate victims’ 
accounts of domestic violence, but still lament that courts frequently do not accept such victims’ 
accounts for adjudicative purposes. Jaffe et al., supra note 81, at 507–08. William Austin points out that 
no methodology currently exists to assess credibility in this context and emphasizes the need to look to 
external corroborating or disconfirming evidence. See Austin, supra note 98.  
 150.  See, e.g., GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION, supra note 89; GARDNER, THE 
PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME, supra note 109. Domestic-violence advocates argue that 
evaluators not trained in domestic-violence assessment tend to discount claims. See CLARE DALTON ET 
AL., NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A 
JUDGE’S GUIDE 1, 17, 19 n.35 (2006).  
 151.  See generally E. MARK CUMMINGS & PATRICK DAVIES, MARITAL CONFLICT AND 
CHILDREN: AN EMOTIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE (2010); Robert Emery, Interparental Conflict 
and the Children of Discord and Divorce, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 310 (1982). 
 152.  But the DSM-4-TR does not include PAS as a disorder or even as one of several “Criteria Sets 
and Axes Provided for Further Study.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 146, at 759. Moreover, the 
recently published fifth edition of the manual does not include any official mention of PAS. See AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed., 
2013).  
 153.  Bow, Gould & Flens, supra note 81, at 134–35 (study of MHPs showing twenty-six percent of 
custody evaluations involve alienation, but seventy-five percent of respondents did not view alienation 
as a “syndrome.”).  
 154.  This is probably because parental cooperation in general is an important consideration. See 
supra text accompanying notes 144–146.  
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parent’s active alcoholism).155 Although not all MHPs subscribe to Gardner’s 
claim that granting custody to the alienated parent is the prescribed “cure” for 
the disorder, an expert’s conclusion that a child’s hostility towards one parent is 
based on the other parent’s alienating behavior can be dispositive in shaping 
her recommendation.156 
Despite its influence on MHPs and courts, the “diagnosis” of PAS lacks any 
credible scientific basis.157 Gardner’s studies fail to meet minimal requirements 
universally recognized in the scientific community.158 The study on which 
Gardner based his diagnosis used no statistical analysis and was not subject to 
independent evaluation through publication in a peer-reviewed journal—a core 
requirement for legitimate scientific research.159 Further, his research has never 
been replicated, another key criterion of valid research.160 
Scientists have begun to study children who are aligned with one parent and 
hostile to the other in the context of family breakdown, but this research, to 
date, offers little guidance to courts. It suggests that the causes of children’s 
alienation are complex: Either or neither parent can contribute to the 
estrangement. Some children might simply align with a parent in response to 
the family crisis.161 Scientists also cannot yet predict the impact of alienation on 
the child’s future relationship with the targeted parent. And they do not know 
whether separating the child from the aligned parent does more harm than 
good. 
Parental alienation might be a good theoretical proxy for best interests, but 
in practice it depends on evidence that is not verifiable, because the construct is 
 
 155.  Alienation was deemed more important than domestic violence, the child’s emotional 
relationship with each parent, and each parent’s emotional well-being. Ackerman & Ackerman, supra 
note 134, at 142. 
 156.  Nicholas Bala, Suzanne Hunt & Carolyn McCarney, Parental Alienation: Canadian Court 
Cases 1989–2008, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 164, 166 (2010) (in Canadian study, judges found alienation in 82 of 
135 cases between 1999 and 2008). 
 157.  See Robert Emery, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents Bear the Burden of Proof, 43 
FAM. CT. REV. 8 (2005) (challenging scientific merit of PAS); Joan Kelly & Janet Johnston, The 
Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 249 (2001) 
(criticizing PAS as lacking scientific basis and proposing sounder approach to identifying alienated 
children); Janet Johnston & Joan Kelly, Rejoinder to Garner’s “Commentary on Kelly and Johnston’s 
‘The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome,’ 42 FAM. CT. REV. 622 (2004) 
(response to Gardner’s critique of authors’ earlier article). 
 158.  For example, his diagnosis of PAS was based almost entirely on interviews with his clients, 
parents who claimed to be the victim of alienation. See GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION 
SYNDROME, supra note 109, at 41 (explaining that “the likelihood of my obtaining cooperation from 
more than a small percentage of the alienators was extremely small”).  
 159.  Gardner acknowledged the lack of statistical analysis in PAS studies. See Richard A. Gardner, 
Commentary on Kelly and Johnston’s “The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of the Parental Alienation 
Syndrome,” 42 FAM. CT. REV. 611, 617 (2004).  
 160.  No empirical studies have validated PAS. See sources cited supra note 157.  
 161.  Janet Johnston, in a study of high-conflict custody disputes, observed that preadolescent 
children (roughly eight to twelve years old) align defensively with one parent in high-conflict divorces 
and found many sources of hostility besides brainwashing. Janet Johnston, Parental Alignments and 
Rejection: An Empirical Study of Alienation in Children of Divorce, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 
158, 158 (2003).  
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complex and involves qualitative assessments based on problematic predictions, 
interpretations, and inferences. Currently, there is no legitimate basis for 
evaluating the source of alienation in many cases, or of its impact on the child’s 
welfare or importance relative to other custody factors. MHPs who offer 
opinions on alienation in custody proceedings are acting beyond the limits of 
scientific knowledge. 
D. Bad Science and the Absence of Evidentiary Standards 
The misuse of psychological science in custody proceedings is facilitated by 
the absence of the evidentiary restrictions that apply to other legal proceedings. 
The admissibility of scientific evidence is regulated in most state and federal 
courts by the Daubert test, devised by the Supreme Court to exclude unreliable 
testimony and assure that the expert’s input is relevant to the facts at issue in 
the case.162 The mandate that scientific evidence be subject to a threshold 
examination for validity and reliability is guided by the intuition that expert 
witnesses rendering opinions can disproportionately influence fact finders 
simply by virtue of their status as experts.163 
For the most part, testimony by MHPs in custody proceedings has not been 
subject to this screening: Few jurisdictions require systematic scrutiny of the 
scientific merits of these experts’ opinions.164 In part, courts may abstain from 
screening because most experts in custody proceedings are neutral and court 
appointed, and the judge’s appointment probably evidences her confidence in 
the scientific merit of the expert’s opinion.165 Further, because judges, and not 
juries, hear custody cases in most states, appellate courts might believe that 
judges can sort good from bad science as they consider expert opinions. 
But little evidence supports this assumption. Courts routinely consider 
expert testimony on PAS, for example, despite the lack of any scientific 
 
 162.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (holding that evidence must 
be grounded in reliable scientific methodology and reasoning and must be relevant to the facts of case). 
Daubert replaced Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for federal purposes, but the Frye 
test is still applied in a few states. See CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 121, at 58–74. Daubert directs 
judges deciding whether scientific evidence is admissible to evaluate whether the theoretical basis of 
the opinion is testable, whether the technique or approach on which it is based has been subject to peer 
review, and whether the technique or approach is generally accepted in the general scientific 
community. 509 U.S. at 593.  
 163.  See CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 121, at 40.  
 164.  See White v. Kimrey, 847 So. 2d 157, 164–65 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (accepting PAS diagnosis and 
giving father physical custody); Karen B. v. Clyde M., 574 N.Y.S.2d 267, 267 (Fam. Ct. 1991) (accepting 
PAS diagnosis in concluding sexual abuse allegation is fabricated); Doerman v. Doerman, No. CA2001-
03-071, 2002 WL 1358792, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 2002) (upholding decision to retain custody in 
father due to mother’s severe PAS). In criminal proceedings, some courts have rejected PAS testimony. 
See, e.g., People v. Loomis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788–89 (County Ct. 1997) (rejecting PAS testimony to 
show child sexual abuse allegation was fabricated).   
 165.  Thomas Reidy, Richard Silver & Alan Carlson, Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 
23 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1989) (weighing court-appointed experts’ opinions more heavily than those of party 
experts).  
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foundation for this diagnosis.166 In general, scientific observers have concluded 
that most psychological evidence currently admitted in these proceedings would 
be excluded under Daubert, and should not carry weight in judges’ decisions.167 
As long as the best-interests standard persists as the custody decision rule, 
judges are likely to urge mental-health experts to offer opinions on the ultimate 
issue of custody unless they are legally restricted from doing so by the 
evidentiary screen that applies to other legal proceedings. This collaboration 
between judges and MHPs has contributed to the entrenchment of the best-
interests standard; the assumption that MHPs have the expertise to guide courts 
in applying the standard obscures its intractable evidentiary challenges. The 
problem is that psychological experts cannot perform this assignment without 
exceeding the boundaries of their scientific expertise, and their participation in 
custody proceedings does nothing to improve the accuracy of custody 
determinations. 
VI 
REFORMING THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD 
Our account of the state of modern custody law and practice is somewhat 
gloomy: Current doctrine is even more problematic than Professor Mnookin 
and other scholars have recognized, and it is reinforced by a powerful political 
dynamic that impedes reform and also by misplaced confidence in the ability of 
mental-health experts to guide courts in making custody determinations. Under 
the conditions that we have described, what steps can be taken to improve 
custody decisionmaking? 
In this part, we explore reforms that potentially can reduce the error and 
other costs of resolving custody disputes and that have some prospect of 
adoption by lawmakers. Most ambitiously, we propose that the best-interests 
standard be refined and narrowed through the adoption of the ALI 
approximation standard, a sound and relatively verifiable proxy for best 
interests for which accurate evidence can be obtained.168 Approximation 
allocates custody on the basis of past caretaking in most cases, and thus largely 
obviates the need for psychological testimony. It also represents a compromise 
between the alternative rules favored by mothers and fathers, which both 
interest groups might ultimately be persuaded to accept. Moreover, other 
stakeholders who currently support the best-interests standard may favor this 
alternative rule if they comprehend that MHPs lack the expertise to guide 
judges in making custody decisions. 
 
 166.  See sources cited supra note 164. 
 167.  See Erickson et al., supra note 125; Shuman, supra note 118. Tippins and Wittman note that 
“scholarly argument supporting the empirical foundations for . . . [custody] recommendations is scant to 
nonexistent . . . .” Tippins & Wittman, supra note 16, at 211. In part VI, we argue that Daubert, 509 U.S. 
579, should be applied to custody proceedings and that evidence on PAS should be excluded.  
 168.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2002); Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 
4.  
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But even under the current legal standard, evidentiary and procedural 
reforms can be implemented to improve custody decisionmaking. First, reforms 
that promote accuracy in adjudication are desirable. Lawmakers should restrict 
the role of psychological experts by applying to custody proceedings the 
standards that govern the admissibility of scientific evidence in other legal 
proceedings.169 Second, reforms that aim to avoid adjudication altogether, such 
as collaborative divorce170 and mediation, have gained traction in many states as 
lawmakers recognize that, in most cases, parents are in a better position than 
judges to plan for their children’s future custody.171 
A. The Case for Approximation 
The approximation standard allocates future custody proportionately 
between the parents on the basis of the caretaking roles they had while the 
family was intact.172 Unlike the primary-caretaker preference, approximation 
does not frame the custody decision as a zero-sum game in which one parent 
wins and the other loses. In most cases, the parents continue to share 
decisionmaking authority and each parents’ allocation of physical custody is 
determined on the basis of the family’s past practices. Current research 
indicates that fathers perform about one-third of child care;173 thus, a typical 
custody order would allocate time between the parents on this basis. If the 
parents have shared caretaking responsibility equally before dissolution, their 
custody arrangement will be much like joint physical custody. 
Although no custody rule will provide the optimal outcome in every case, 
approximation mirrors the underlying policy goals of custody law at least as 
well as do any of the psychological and emotional factors that currently serve as 
proxies for best interests. Basing custody on past parental care promotes 
continuity and stability in the child’s environment and relationships, preserving 
caretaking arrangements with which both the child and the parents are 
familiar.174 Approximation is grounded not only in developmental knowledge 
 
 169.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. 
 170.  In collaborative divorce, both parties and their attorneys stipulate that, if the parties cannot 
reach agreement, the attorneys will not represent them in adjudicating the dispute. See generally 
Penelope Bryan, “Collaborative Divorce”: Meaningful Reform or Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 1001 (1999).  
 171. See Singer, supra note 19 (describing this trend). Some states mandate mediation for most 
couples who petition for a hearing. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3170–3173 (West 2004) (directing 
mediation in most cases upon petition for custody hearing).  
 172. See Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4 (proposing 
approximation standard). In 2000, the ALI adopted a custody standard based on approximation. See 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002). 
 173.  See Suzanne Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change or 
Surprising Continuity?, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401, 411 (2000) (reporting study with this finding). A division 
of custodial time in which one parent gets 120 days or more of custodial time per year constitutes joint 
custody for child-support purposes in many states. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (2009).  
 174.  Many joint-custody families drift toward an arrangement in which the child lives 
predominately with the mother. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 127, at 162–70. This might 
suggest that parents (and children) are more comfortable with their predissolution roles than with the 
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that confirms the importance of the bond between the child and the caretaking 
parent,175 but also in recent research confirming the critical role of fathers as 
secondary parents. 
Moreover, approximation creates a proxy that is easier to verify than the 
qualitative factors prominent under the best-interests standard and it functions 
as a substitute for key factors that are otherwise nonverifiable. Under the 
approximation standard, relevant evidence includes concrete behavior that 
establishes the family’s caretaking practices and routines; thus, qualitative 
evidence is inadmissible except in those cases where one parent is alleged to be 
unfit to care for the child.176 To be sure, caretaking evidence might also depend 
on private family information. But courts can more accurately evaluate 
objective and quantitative evidence of caretaking than the qualitative factors 
that dominate under current law.177 Furthermore, past caretaking itself provides 
the best available indicator of hard-to-measure factors such as the parent–child 
bond or parental competence. 
The exclusion of qualitative behavioral evidence in all but extreme cases will 
have salutary effects beyond promoting accuracy and reducing the verifiability 
problems faced by courts today. First, restricting the range of evidence should 
discourage litigation and simplify proceedings, thereby reducing adjudication 
costs. It should also reduce the inclination of spouses to focus on each other’s 
deficiencies—the dimension of custody adjudications that has the most costly 
repercussions. Finally, in most cases, there should be little need for 
psychologists in custody proceedings, and those who do participate will be more 
motivated to offer observations within the scope of their expertise. 
How will evidence of domestic violence and parental alienation be dealt 
with under the approximation standard? Evidence of serious domestic violence 
can fairly be treated as evidence that a parent is unfit for custody; it should 
continue to operate as a trump in determining custody. We will suggest some 
reforms that might assist courts in accurately evaluating domestic-violence 
claims. Evidence of alienation, in contrast, should be excluded: We simply lack 
adequate knowledge to evaluate alienation claims and to weigh the importance 
of alienation in a framework that focuses on caretaking roles. 
 
preferences they expressed at the time of divorce. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child 
Custody, supra note 4, at 635.  
 175. Attachment theory emphasizes the bond between the child and the caretaking parent; it has 
been invoked in support of the primary-caretaker preference. For the classic treatment, see generally 
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD (1973) (applying attachment theory in support of primary-caretaker preference).  
 176.  Unfitness has always been a basis for excluding a parent from custody. Proof of serious 
domestic violence constitutes unfitness under most states’ presumptions. See supra text accompanying 
note 85. 
 177.  Courts should be able to discern the approximate extent to which parents share caretaking 
responsibilities. If one parent does not work outside the home, a presumption that she is a primary 
caretaker is reasonable. If both parents work full-time, then teachers, physicians, coworkers, and 
babysitters can corroborate or undermine the assumption that the parents have shared caretaking 
responsibilities.  
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Notwithstanding the merits of the approximation approach, the political-
economy deadlock described in part III might impede its implementation. But 
since approximation does represent a compromise between the rules favored by 
advocates for mothers and fathers, neither is likely to mobilize against this 
reform with the intensity directed against gender-based reform proposals. 
Moreover, if fathers continue to assume a more active role in child care, a norm 
of equal sharing of custodial responsibility might emerge. Even today, typical 
custody arrangements under an approximation standard would be closer to 
shared custody than to the traditional custody and visitation.178 Approximation 
is less vulnerable to allegations of unfairness by either mothers or fathers than 
alternative rules, including the best-interests standard.179 Approximation offers 
no windfall for a minimally involved parent,180 and it also does not relegate 
either parent to second-class “visitor” status. 
Mothers’ and fathers’ groups have dominated political-reform efforts 
related to custody doctrine, but neither is likely to take the lead in promoting 
the approximation standard. However, other stakeholders, including advocates 
for children, family-law attorneys, and judges, can play this role. Attorneys’ and 
judges’ groups have joined with mothers’ groups to defeat joint-custody 
legislation, defending the discretionary best-interests standard. But these 
groups and others who elevate the interests of children over those of either 
mothers or fathers might well be enlisted in support of the approximation 
standard if they come to appreciate the peculiar deficiencies of the best-
interests standard. Family-court judges care about making custody decisions 
that promote children’s welfare, and currently they believe that they can apply 
the best-interests standard with the assistance of MHPs. If judges understand 
that their confidence in psychological expertise is misplaced, they may support 
reform. Moreover, some evidence suggests that legislators would welcome an 
environment in which custody-reform efforts were driven less by gender politics 
than has been the case over the past generation.181 The ALI’s adoption of the 
approximation standard gives the standard credibility as a custody rule that has 
been studied and endorsed by a respected organization of attorneys, judges, and 
academics.182 Approximation may appeal to a new coalition of advocates who 
 
 178.  Recent studies indicate that fathers currently provide about one-third of childcare in married 
families, so approximation would result in greater custodial sharing than traditional arrangements. 
Bianchi, supra note 173; see generally Robert Emery, Rule or Rorschach? Approximating Children’s 
Best Interests, 1 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 132, 132 (2007).  
 179. See sources cited supra note 71 (providing evidence that the best-interests standard tends to 
favor mothers).  
 180.  Some mothers’ advocates hold this view of joint custody. This response seems less likely if 
parents shared caretaking responsibility equally when the family was intact. Scott, Pluralism, Parental 
Preference and Child Custody, supra note 4, at 625.  
 181.  Hearing on SB 243 and SB 244, supra note 74 (statement of Bill Howe, Chair, Oregon Task 
Force on Family Law).  
 182.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002). The principles, including the approximation standard, were approved by 
the Council of the American Law Institute and adopted by the ALI membership in 2000.  
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have thus far played a subsidiary role and to legislators seeking to reduce the 
emotional costs of resolving child-custody disputes. 
B. Improving Accuracy in Custody Proceedings 
Even if the best-interests standard remains the legal rule, there are several 
procedural reforms that can improve the ability of courts to obtain accurate 
information regarding family functioning. First, psychological experts whose 
input is solicited in custody proceedings should be restricted to testimony based 
on evidence that has a solid scientific basis. Second, enhanced standards of 
proof can deter marginal domestic-violence claims and thereby increase the 
likelihood that legitimate claims will be recognized. 
In most legal proceedings, scientific evidence offered by experts is 
admissible only after it is screened for reliability and relevance.183 As we have 
discussed, no such restrictions limit the admissibility of psychological evidence 
in custody proceedings.184 Opinions based on bad science can be excluded if 
psychological testimony in custody proceedings is subject to the same screening 
that aims to exclude deficient or irrelevant expert testimony in legal trials 
generally.185 
The potential benefits of this reform apply most clearly to evidence offered 
by neutral evaluators appointed by courts. When parties seek to introduce 
psychological evidence, both opposing counsel and the court are typically 
sensitive to deficiencies and biases in the expert’s opinion. But the expertise of 
a court-appointed psychologist is often unquestioned and her opinion thus 
carries authoritative weight. As we have shown, however, there is little support 
for the assumption that an expert’s “neutrality” means that her opinion will be 
unbiased and based on scientifically reliable methods and procedures. Without 
a formal opportunity to challenge the court-appointed expert’s opinion before it 
is offered in evidence, the party disfavored by the opinion is often seriously 
disadvantaged. Applying the conventional scrutiny to this evidence can reduce 
undue deference to the opinions of these experts. 
 
 183.  See supra text accompanying note 162; see also CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 121, at 29–
74 (discussing admissiblility standards); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN 
LAW 30–43 (4th ed. 1998).  
 184.  See supra text accompanying notes 157–160, 164 (noting PAS testimony is often admitted in 
custody proceedings but rejected in criminal and tort proceedings). The response to “child sexual abuse 
accommodation syndrome” is similar. Courts typically exclude this evidence in criminal sexual-abuse 
cases when it is introduced in support of the credibility of the claim. See State v. Moran 728 P.2d 248 
(Ariz. 1988) (excluding evidence that child’s behavior is consistent with sexual abuse); Mindombe v. 
United States, 795 A.2d 39 (D.C. 2002). Evidence of the syndrome (or that the child showed behaviors 
consistent with sexual abuse) has been admitted in custody proceedings. See, e.g., In re Cheryl H., 200 
Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1984); Tracy V. v. Donald W., 632 N.Y.S.2d 697 (App. Div. 1995) (basing 
custody decision on expert testimony that child’s behavior (including overeating) corroborated 
allegation of sexual abuse); Matter of Le Favour v. Koch, 508 N.Y.S.2d 320 (App. Div. 1986) (admitting 
expert testimony that child’s allegation was “worthy of belief” in custody proceeding).  
 185.  See supra text accompanying notes 164–165.  
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This reform would represent a substantial change in judicial practice, 
severely limiting the role of MHPs in custody proceedings. Expert opinions 
about the optimal custody arrangement would be excluded, along with 
unscientific diagnoses such as PAS. Beyond this, MHPs would be discouraged 
from offering pure credibility assessments, unsubstantiated predictions, or 
qualitative assessments on the basis of unsupported inferences. Testimony 
based on direct observations (and limited interpretation of this data) and 
established diagnoses would be admissible, but courts would have to undertake 
the demanding calculus required by the best-interests standard without the 
assistance of psychological experts. This challenge may expose that the 
predominant legal standard is unworkable. 
How would this evidentiary reform affect the application of the domestic-
violence presumption? Raising the standard applied to evidence supporting 
claims of family violence will assist courts in separating legitimate allegations 
from those that are marginal. This reform would retain the presumption 
disfavoring for custody a parent who has engaged in domestic violence, but 
would limit its application to cases in which a parent’s allegation is supported by 
substantial corroborating evidence.186 This evidence could include medical or 
police reports from recent or past incidents or the testimony of witnesses. But 
courts would not permit clinical testimony that the claimant is credible. Neither 
judges nor MHPs should be asked to choose between the competing accounts of 
parents: They are simply not qualified to perform this task.187 The requirement 
of corroborating evidence may exclude some legitimate claims of family 
violence, but the permissive evidentiary standard that prevails under current 
law encourages strategic behavior that ultimately may lead to judicial 
skepticism about family-violence claims in general.188 
C. Avoiding Adjudication: Collaborative Divorce and Mediation 
Even if the approximation standard and the proposed evidentiary reforms 
are adopted, litigating custody will always be a costly undertaking. Outcomes 
are subject to error, and adjudication is expensive and likely to generate 
hostility between the parents, undermining their ability to cooperate in raising 
their child. Thus, most families will benefit if parents avoid adjudication 
altogether by making decisions about custody themselves. Two promising 
approaches might assist parents in achieving this goal. Collaborative divorce 
 
 186.  An alternative advocated by one thoughtful reader is to require an elevated burden of proof 
(clear and convincing evidence), but not to absolutely exclude the claimant who lacks corroborating 
evidence of abuse. This is a plausible alternative that might separate strategic from legitimate claims, 
but we are somewhat reluctant to endorse it because it depends on a judicial credibility assessment.  
 187.  Some state statutes require corroborating evidence. See ABA COMM. DOM. VIOLENCE, supra 
note 60.   
 188.  Johnston et al., supra note 88. A smaller percentage of child–sexual abuse claims are 
substantiated. Id. at 287. Johnston, Lee, Olesen and Walters include “expert testimony” as a 
corroborating factor. Id. at 287. On our view, this alone cannot count as corroboration; thus the rate of 
corroboration is lower than they estimate. 
3_SCOTT & EMERY_EIC (RECOVERED) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014  9:39 AM 
106 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:69 
involves a precommitment compact by parties and their attorneys to negotiate a 
settlement agreement. For parents who cannot resolve their disputes through 
negotiation, mediation offers a process that facilitates agreement to the lasting 
benefit of both parents and children. 
Collaborative divorce strategies were devised to encourage parties to reach 
agreement about custody and other divorce matters by increasing the cost of 
adjudication ex ante.189 Parties and their attorneys execute a contract in which 
attorneys agree that they will not represent their clients if negotiations fail and 
the dispute moves to litigation. This commitment to negotiating with the goal of 
reaching agreement is likely to reduce threats, bluffs, and other strategic 
behavior that can cause negotiations to break down. Further, the anticipated 
financial and psychological cost to the parties of finding new attorneys to 
represent them in litigation should deter uncooperative behavior in 
negotiations. 
In custody mediation, parents make decisions about their child’s future 
custody while the mediator controls the process, pressing the parents to 
separate hostile feelings for each other from their mutual concern for their 
child.190 Although this form of dispute resolution might not be appropriate in 
some families, research studies indicate that resolving custody disputes through 
mediation is generally associated with better postdivorce outcomes for parents 
and children. 
A major longitudinal study by Robert Emery and his colleagues supports 
this conclusion.191 In both randomized trials as well as evaluations of large-scale 
programs, mediation, as compared to attorney negotiations and formal 
adjudication, was shown to (1) result in a larger percentage of cases settled out 
of court,192 (2) substantially increase party satisfaction with the process of 
 
 189.  Bryan, supra note 170. Many articles about collaborative divorce have appeared in bar 
journals. See, e.g., Patricia Gearity, ADR and Collaborative Lawyering in Family Law, 35 MD. B.J. 2 
(2002); Mary Gallagher, Collaborative Divorce, 164 N.J. L.J. 1 (2001); Shiela Gutterman, Collaborative 
Family Law, 30 COLO. LAW. 57 (2001).  
 190.  Mediators can challenge parties’ strategic behavior and encourage them to find areas of 
overlapping interest that might suggest solutions to their dispute. See EMERY, RENEGOTIATING 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 29, at 147.  
 191.  These researchers studied seventy-one mostly low-income families in which the parents had 
failed to reach agreement about custody. The families were randomly assigned to mediation or 
adversary-resolution groups and tracked periodically, including by way of a twelve-year follow-up. 
Robert E. Emery & Melissa Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: An Experimental 
Evaluation of the Experience of Parents, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 179 (1987); Robert 
E. Emery, Sheila Matthews & Melissa Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Further Evidence 
on the Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 410 (1991) 
[hereinafter Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation]; Robert E. Emery, Sheila Matthews 
& Katherine Kitzmann, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Parents’ Satisfaction and Functioning a 
Year After Settlement, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 124 (1994); Robert E. Emery, Lisa 
Billings, Mary Waldron, David Sbarra & Peter Dillon, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: 
Custody, Contact, and Co-Parenting 12 Years After Initial Dispute Resolution, 69 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323 (2001) [hereinafter Emery et al., Mediation and Litigation 12 Years After].  
 192.  See Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation, supra note 191, at 412 (showing that 
eleven percent of the cases randomly assigned to mediation, compared to seventy-two percent of the 
3_SCOTT & EMERY_EIC (RECOVERED) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014  9:39 AM 
No. 1 2014] GENDER POLITICS AND CHILD CUSTODY 107 
dispute resolution,193 and, most importantly, (3) lead to improved relationships 
between nonresidential parents and children, as well as between the separated 
or divorced parents themselves.194 The researchers found that nonresidential 
parents who mediated maintained closer contact with their children and saw 
them more often than those who litigated.195 Interparental conflict was 
significantly lower in the mediation group.196 Moreover, twelve years after 
divorce, residential parents in the mediation group reported more cooperation, 
communication, and involvement on the part of nonresidential parents.197 This 
study supports the potential of mediation to bring about improved family 
relationships even many years after separation and divorce. 
To be sure, mediation is not a panacea. The quality of mediators varies and 
some court-based mediation programs reportedly coerce parents to reach 
agreement, which might disadvantage one party where there is a power 
imbalance in the relationship.198 Moreover, more research is needed to support 
the positive findings of studies by Emery and others. Nonetheless, existing 
evidence strongly suggests that less adversarial approaches to dispute resolution 
promote cooperation and involvement of both parents after divorce, factors 
strongly correlated with child and family well-being. 
Many observers have noted the irony that the best-interests standard seems 
designed instead to undermine children’s welfare in the context of family 
dissolution.199 Making progress toward a child-custody regime that promotes the 
 
cases assigned to the adversary-resolution group, involved appearance in front of a judge).  
 193.  Emery and his colleagues found that, on average, parents reported greater satisfaction with 
mediation than adversary resolution on items assessing both the presumed strengths of mediation (for 
example, “your feelings were understood”) and the presumed strengths of litigation (for example, 
“your rights were protected”). Fathers reported more satisfaction with mediation, perhaps because 
mothers usually won in court and therefore were generally quite satisfied with litigation. Id. at 415. 
 194.  For a summary of the studies by Emery and his colleagues, sources cited supra note 191, 
together with findings from other major research studies, see Robert E. Emery, David Sbarra & Tara 
Grover, Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 22 (2005). 
 195.  See Emery et al., Mediation and Litigation 12 Years After, supra note 191, at 330. Twelve years 
after the initial dispute, 30% of nonresidential mediation-group parents saw their children once a week 
or more, whereas only 9% of nonresidential adversary resolution–group parents did. Id. Likewise, 54% 
of nonresidential meditation-group parents spoke to their children on the telephone once a week or 
more, whereas only 13% of nonresidential adversary resolution–group parents did. Id.  
 196.  Id. at 323. 
 197.  Id. at 326 (comparing the reports of residential parents in both the mediation and adversary-
resolution groups, nonresidential mediation-group parents (1) were significantly more likely to discuss 
problems with their residential counterparts, (2) had a greater influence on childrearing decisions, and 
(3) were more involved in the children’s discipline, grooming, moral training, errands, holidays, 
significant events, school or church functions, recreational activities, and vacations).  
 198.  Opponents have been critical of mandatory mediation generally and of any use of mediation in 
custody disputes involving domestic violence; statutes authorize courts to exclude violence-involving 
cases from mediation. See CAL. FAM. CODE §3170(b) (West 2004); see generally Tina Grillo, The 
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). In general, mandatory 
mediation only requires attendance at one educational session, after which parties are free to pursue 
other dispute resolution. Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The 
Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 372 (2009). 
 199.  See Robert E. Emery & Melissa Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 472 (1987). 
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interests of children will not be easy, but the reforms outlined above will go 
some distance toward reducing the costs of custody decisionmaking and 
ultimately the costs of divorce itself. The approximation standard is based on a 
relatively uncontroversial proxy for best interests and its adoption would reduce 
error costs under the best-interests standard. Moreover, even if the current law 
is retained, evidentiary reforms, particularly restriction of MHPs’ participation 
in custody proceedings, may improve accuracy and clarify that experts cannot 
resolve the indeterminacy of the best-interests standard. Finally, encouraging 
parents to resolve custody disputes through cooperative negotiation and 
mediation rather than litigation will result in better outcomes for most families. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The entrenchment of the best-interests standard over the past forty years 
can be understood as arising from two quite different but interrelated sources. 
First, a political-economy deadlock resulting from a gender war between 
advocates for fathers and mothers has deterred movement toward a more 
determinate rule. Second, judges are relatively satisfied with the standard in 
part because they can enlist mental-health experts, who are assumed to have the 
expertise to guide custody decisionmaking. But we have demonstrated that 
neither mental-health experts nor courts have the expertise to apply the best-
interests standard in many cases. Recognition of this incapacity may break the 
political-economy deadlock and provide the necessary catalyst for needed 
reforms. 
 
